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ABSTRACT
The collapse o f the USSR, together with its econom ic and political 
repercussions, has also caused the emergence o f the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea as a m ajor question in the Caspian region. The legal status issue 
has been on the agenda since the end o f the 19*'’ century, when the Sea had 
two litto ral states, Russia and Persia. Under the rule of Russia and Persia the 
Sea was legally accepted as an ‘enclosed sea ’, but the navigational practice 
and resource m anagem ent were conducted as if it was a ‘boundary lake’.
The legal status problem  has become more in tricate  as the quantity of 
the neighboring states, thus the clashing in terests over the Caspian Sea have 
increased. The debate over the legal status of the Sea has been so com plicated 
that it is hard to classify and characterize the argum ents of the parties of the 
debate.
W hile a consensus on the division of the Caspian Sea has been reached, 
there are still many problem s concerning the regulations on the Caspian Sea, 
which need the cooperation and agreem ent of the litto ra l states, on both 
b ilateral and m ultilateral levels. The border dispute among the litto ral states 
of the Caspian Sea is one o f the prospective threats to the cooperative 
atm osphere in the region, especially the one between A zerbaijan and 
Turkm enistan.
IV
ÖZET
Sovyetler Birliği’nin çöküşü, pek çok ekonomik ve politik etkisinin yanında Hazar 
Denizi’nin hukuki statüsünün de ciddi bir problem olarak ortaya çıkmasına sebep oldu. Hazar 
Denizi’nin hukuki statüsü 19. yüzyılın sonundan itibaren, o zamanki kıyı devletleri Rusya ve 
İran’dan müteşekkil iken de gündemdeydi. Rus ve İran idaresi altında, Hazar Denizi hukuki 
olarak ‘kapalı deniz’ şeklinde adlandırılıyor, ancak denizcilik ve yer altı kaynaklarının 
kullanım açısından ‘sınır gölü’ kuralları uygulanıyordu.
Hukuki statü meselesi, kıyı devletlerin  sayılarının, dolayısıy la çakışan 
m enfaatlerin  artm asıyla birlik te çok daha karm aşık bir hal aldı. Hazar 
D enizi’nin hukuki statüsü üzerine devam eden tartışm a öyle karışık  bir hal 
aldı ki, ta ra f devletlerin  argüm anlarını tam tespit edebilm ek çok zor hale 
geldi.
Hazar D en izi’nin bölünmesi hususunda genel bir anlaşm aya varılm ış 
olsa bile, halen bütün kıyı devletlerin  üzerinde ortak çalışm ayla anlaşm aya 
varm aları gereken düzenlem elerle ilgili problem ler m evcuttur. Hazar Denizi 
üzerindeki sınır tartışm aları, hususen Azerbaycan ve Türkm enistan arasındaki 
sınır anlaşm azlığı, bölgedeki işbirliğ i ve uyum havasını zedeleyebilecek 
tehditlerin  başında gelm ektedir.
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CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION
The end of the 20"' century has witnessed a period of serious changes and 
transition. A series of developments in the 1980s gave birth to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and although the immediate effects were regional, its repercussions were on the 
global level. On one hand, international relations specialists have begun to deal with the 
new global structure, and new prospects for the future of international relations are being 
formulated. On the other hand as the Iron Curtain, which strictly prohibited any relations 
between the communist nations and the others was broken down, both the newly 
independent countries (in search for political and economic support and stability) and the 
developed states (searching for new markets and new reservoirs of resources) increased 
mutual political and economic contact.
1.1. Caspian Basin in History
“Once a center of commerce, the Caspian Sea region began losing its significance 
ever since the rise of the sailing ship rendered the Silk Road out of date a half millennium 
ago.”  ^ The Iron Curtain during the Soviet communist regime left the region outside the 
global view. In this context, these newly independent states have become the focus of 
attention only in the last decade of the 20'*’ century.
1. 2. The Caspian Sea as the Focus of Attention
The importance of the Caspian basin has increased surprisingly as it is realized 
that it was not destabilization that the collapse ended in, but prospective economic and 
security advantages for the developed countries. So, not only the littoral states, but also 
the outside powers have involved in the issues related with the Caspian Sea. These powers 
at the beginning were restricted to the USA and to some extent Turkey. However, as the 
prize of the Caspian become to be known, the quantity of the outsiders increased. 
Alongside the European countries, the other superpowers of the world, such as China and 
Japan, also engaged in the Caspian matters. While the Russian side cannot help escaping 
from its imperial ambitions, thus aspiring to take all the activities in the region under its 
control, and developing its legal argument on the status of the Sea on this account, the 
outside powers are indirectly becoming the sides of the issue with their giant oU 
companies, some of which are powerful than most states. Thus, the interests of the 
companies also affected the determination process of the status dispute to a large extent.
The first reason for the region to become the focus of attention is the significance 
of the political dominance over the region. As is always the case, to obtain the political 
upper hand in a geostrategically vital region is the first goal of all the global powers. 
Especially, as the region has vast economic prospects, the struggle for power in the 
Caspian basin has been a strong factor in determining strategies over economic and energy 
issues. The second reason for the region being a focus of attention is the discovery of huge 
amounts of hydrocarbon energy resources. This is a crucial factor, for the reason that
’ Martha Brill Olcott, “The Caspian’s False Promise,’’ Foreign Policy 111 (Summer 98); 94.
inadequacy of energy resources has been and will increasingly be the most serious problem 
of the world civilization, which is based on energy. The economic gift of these resources 
that will enrich both the Caspian region's states -which urgently need the profits from this 
gift for their economic survival and for the political future of their leaders- and all the 
involving countries and entities (such as firms and companies), also increases the 
significance of the exploration of hydrocarbon energy resources.
1. 3. The Legal Status Dispute
After the dissolution of USSR, many problems have emerged in the Caspian 
region. The solution to these problems has to be found in cooperation among the littoral 
states. However, the political and economic power struggle has hardened to reach this aim. 
One of these problems is the legal status dispute. As three new states have appeared by the 
Caspian Sea littoral, new regulations had to be established in the Sea. The Caspian Sea, 
which had two neighboring countries, USSR and Iran, now has five. The legal status issue 
is not by itself the core of the problem. The exploitation of mineral resources in the Sea 
and their transportation through pipelines have made the issue much more important and 
decisive. While the power struggle causes the delay in reaching a solution, in the mean 
time the ambiguity of the legal status of the Caspian Sea causes several problems.
The dispute over the status of the Sea halts or at least risks many utilization 
projects. There have already been border disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 
emanating from the uncertainty of the legal status, and have caused in bringing some
economic initiatives to a standstill. Besides, it seems that such problems have also come 
out between Russia and Kazakstan, although they have reached some kind of an agreement 
on delimitation of the Caspian Sea between themselves.
1. 4. Description of the Thesis
In this thesis, a historical-legal background of the Caspian basin and the legal 
practice in the Sea will be presented. In the general assessments to the problem, only the 
Tiirkmen9ay (1828) agreement between Persia and Russian Empire before the USSR, and 
the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties have been proposed as the main historical legal 
supports in determining the current status of the Caspian. In this research, the legal 
exercise in the basin throughout history will be held in detail as a basis for the 
contemporary solution of the issue. Second, the positions of the littoral states on the issue 
win be analyzed with a special attention to the developments after the dissolution of the 
USSR. Then the border disputes emanating from the ambiguity of the status of the Caspian 
Sea win be dealt with, with an emphasis on the dispute between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan over the ownership of the oil fields in the middle of the Caspian. In the 
conclusion section, possible solution to the dispute will be examined taking into account 
the legal and geopolitical factors affecting the decision process of the problem.
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CASPIAN SEA BEFORE 1991
2.1. The name “Caspian”
The Caspian Sea in its whole history had been called with some 40 names. Almost 
aU these names were given in reference to the nations, cities or geographical places aside 
the Sea. Name Hazar (i.e., Khazar), which still refers to the Caspian Sea in Turkish and 
Persian, was given in reference to the Khazars, a medieval Turkic people who had 
established a vast empire stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. It was also 
called as ‘Girkanian Sea’, named after the state by the sea, ‘Girkania’. Russians for a long 
time named it as Khvalynskoe More (i.e., Khvaly Sea) referring to the name of the people 
living in the mouth of Volga.^ The name ‘Caspian’ was given regarding the people called 
Kaspi on the southwestern shores of the Sea.^
2. 2. Descriptions of the Caspian in History
Historical presentations of the geographical characteristics of the Caspian Sea go 
back to the ancient times. Thousands of years ago, scientists and travelers (e.g., Homeros, 
Aristoteles, Herodotos) described or mentioned the Sea in their works, and generally held 
it as a closed, inland sea.'* However, none of these presentations has any contribution to 
the contemporary search for determining the status of the Sea.
CHAPTER П
 ^ P.V. Zhilo, “O Nazvaniiakh Kaspiiskogo Moria,” Izvestiia AN Azerb. SSR. Seriia Geol-Geog. Nauk., 4 
(1960): 94-95.
 ^ K.K. GUI, Kaspiiskoe More (Baku: Aznefteizdat, 1956), 16.
Ibid.
Present-day discussions over the status issue follow strictly the developing 
international legal conceptualization. It is necessary to bear in mind that the legal norms, in 
their character, do not strictly set the decision making process, but leave a vast area for 
some other factors which may influence the case under discussion. One of these factors, 
which is recognized by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention above the international legal 
regulations, is the historical practice, if it is applicable.^ Moreover, it is true that the 
historical experience in the Caspian region plays a decisive role in legal uncertainties. This 
historical experience, m the case of Caspian’s legal status, refers to the official documents 
on the status of the Sea and the historical legal practice of the neighboring states in the 
Sea. In determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea, it has much more significance as 
the involving states on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, in their contemporary 
arguments generally support their solution proposals referring to a practice in history. So, 
rather than the names and the non-legal definitions of the Caspian Sea (such as the above- 
mentioned scholarly definitions) the legal history of the Sea and the nearby states, and the 
different evaluations of the status issue at those times have to be dealt with to reach a 
proper conclusion on the historical practice contributing to the present debate.
 ^ In solving the conflictual cases, while also in setting rules of delimitation and bordering, 1982 UN Law 
of the Sea Convention sensitively sets the condition of lack of a historical point of agreement, as follows: 
“Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, 
failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where 
it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the 
two States in a way, which is at variance therewith.” United Nations, Oceans and Law of the Sea, 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/unclos/closindx.htm> (15 July 200).
Before examining the direct references to the status of the Caspian Sea between 
the lines of the agreements and treaties between the littoral states, and analyzing the 
official and scientific interpretations of the legal status of the Caspian Sea before the 
dissolution of the USSR, the issue of navigational practice by the Sea will be handled. In 
dealing with this issue, it is necessary to separate the military and commercial navigation 
while analyzing the official regulations in the Caspian Sea and evaluating the 
commentaries, for the simple reason that in almost all the relevant sources and legal 
agreements the two issues held separately.
2. 3. Military Navigation by the Caspian Sea
Throughout history, although many nations, states and big powers fought for the 
control over the Caspian Sea, beginning from the 18"' century mainly Russia and Persia 
held the control over the basin. So, beside the military navigational activities of Russia and 
Persia on the Caspian Sea, legal regulations on military navigation wifi be followed in the 
treaties and agreements reached by the littoral states of the Caspian, after giving a brief 
historical background of the military navigation by the Sea.
2. 3.1. Military Navigation by the Caspian Sea in History
One of the earliest Russian campaigns on the Caspian Sea was held on 913 under 
the command of prince Igor when 500 warships made transition into the Caspian Sea. The 
historians recorded one more Russian campaign into the Caspian with 72 warships on 
1175, a little before the Mongol-Tatar attack on the region.^
’ S. A. Vyshnepolskii, Mirovye Morskie Puti i Sudokhodstvo (Moscow: 1953) 456.
Under the rule of the Golden Hord, Russians for almost two centuries had no 
connection with the Caspian Sea. However, as a result of the 1552 occupation of Kazan 
and then the 1556 occupation of Astrakhan and in about a decade establishing control on 
the north-eastern part of Caucasus down to the Terek river, Moscow became the owner of 
the waterway reaching the Caspian. In this way, beyond finding the suitable conditions to 
advance further into the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and on the other hand into 
Turkestan, Russia began to establish its dominance over the Caspian.’ (see Map 1)
In the beginning of the IS'*’ century, the Caspian Sea was almost completely taken 
from the Persians because of the Russian campaign during the reign of Peter I. At that time 
the political and economic significance of the Caspian Sea gained a deeper meaning. The 
Sea was regarded as the most important way to Central Asia and even further to the Indian 
region. Gül mentions the intentions of Peter I on the Caspian Sea and expresses that 
“having learnt the existence of an ancient waterway named ‘Uzboia’, Peter I planned to 
turn Amu Daria to its earlier direction and thus to acquire a waterway to India.”*
The ambitions of Peter I over the Caspian is obvious in his note to his commander 
fighting for the Caucasus; “Control over Baku is vital for the Russian dominance over the 
Caspian and thus to reach Central Asia.”  ^After the death of Peter I, the idea of dominance 
over the Caspian Sea and establishment of a military fleet on the Caspian Sea was 
intercepted.
’ Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri (Ankara: 1992)
® Gül, 17.
’ Bratio Naveki: Dokumenty i Materialy ob 1st. Druzhbe Rus. i Azerb. Narodov (Baku: 1987) 15.
Roughly on 1701, he sent a vessel to the Caspian Sea to prepare a detailed report 
of the geographical and social properties of the basin. In 1721-1722, Russian warships 
entered the Caspian region, with the justification of helping Persia to suppress the Afghan 
rebellion. In this way, Russia occupied some parts of the Caspian shores and even in 1723 
an agreement was reached with the Persian representative in S. Petersburg, recognizing the 
sovereignty of Russian tsar over Derbent, Baku, Gilan, Mazandaran and Astarabad. 
However, Persia did not ratify this agreement and later in 1732, Russia was forced to leave 
the occupied regions.
The first Russian fleet on the Caspian was established on the order of Peter I in 
1732 in Astrakhan. This fleet played a significant role in the wars ending in Gülistan 
Treaty."
It is necessary to note that the end of the 18"* century and the first half of the 19"* 
century was the bloodiest period in the history of Russian-Persian relations. Wars in this 
period were conducted particularly for dominance over the Caspian region, on the Sea 
itself and over the territories on both sides of the Sea.
2. 3. 2. Military Navigation in Documents
The research of available international legal material on Russian-Persian relations 
allows us to make the conclusion that the first international rule of law concerning military 
navigation on the Caspian Sea was set only in the beginning of the 19*'* century, after the
V. Kh. Gizzatov, “Kaspiiskaia Neft i Mezhdunarodnaia Bezopastnost,” in Kaspiiskaia Neft i 
Mezhdunarodnaia Bezopastnost, Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Moscow: 1996), 51.
Mohammad Reza Dabiri, “A New Approach to the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea as a Basis for 
Peace and Development,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs 1&2 (1994): 46.
wars between 1804-1813, by the Gülistan treaty of October 12, 1813. Because of this 
treaty and of inclusion of the norms on military navigation by the Caspian Sea, serious 
political and economic disagreements emerged between Russia and Great Britain as the 
sides of the ‘Great Game’. Despite all efforts of Enghsh diplomacy, Russia forced Persia to 
sign the 1813 agreement. According to the third article of this treaty, Persia recognized the 
sovereignty of the Russian Empire over Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Kuba, Baku and Talysh 
regions, which were before under the Persian control. Thus, it was stated the Persian Shah 
recognized the sovereignty of the Russian emperor over all Dagestan, Georgia, Abkhazia, 
Mingreha, Imeretia and Shuragel province together with the Caspian Sea territories and 
peoples.’^  In the agreement an article forbade Persia from having a military fleet on the 
Caspian Sea, estabhshing mihtary bases on the offshore and onshore regions of the Caspian 
and also from carrying out piracy acts on the sea against the Russian trade ships.
Persia naturally was not satisfied with its humihated situation, especially on the 
Caspian Sea. A new campaign against Russia between 1826 and 1828 ended in a second 
victory of Russia and on February 10, 1828 Türkmençay treaty was signed between the 
two sides. According to this treaty, Russia captured the Erivan and Nakhchevan Khanates. 
The borderline between Russia and Persia set beyond the earlier line at Astara on the river
‘Mirnyi Traktat Mezhdu Rossiei i Persiei, Zakliuchionnyi v Golistane 12 Oktiabria 1813 Goda’, 
Mezhdunarodnaia Politika Noveishego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiiakh, Chast I: Ot 
Frantsuzskoi Revoliutsii do Imperialisticheskoi Voiny (Moscow: 1925) 104.
13 Ibid.
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Arax.''* As it was in the Gülistan treaty Russian side had the exclusive right to have a 
military fleet on the Caspian Sea, while Persia had not.*^
In the second half of the 19'*' century and in the beginning of the 20“' century 
within approximately one century, form the point of regulations on military navigation on 
the Caspian Sea nothing was changed.
The first reference, after the 1917 Revolution in Russia, to navigation by the 
Caspian was made in 1919, although the 1921 Contract is presented as such by some 
researchers.*^ In the third article of the document, it was stated by the Bolshevik 
administration that the Caspian Sea, after it is freed from the pirate vessels of British 
imperialism, would be declared free for the navigation of the vessels flying Persian flag.”
The basic rules regulating the navigation by the Caspian Sea were set in the 
Contract of 1921, according to which the right to navigation by the Caspian was equally 
given to the both sides of the agreement. However, in this regulation the type of navigation 
was not exactly stated. Therefore, the interpretations of the article were also ambiguous 
and conflicting. “Although there are arguments that practically neither Soviet nor Iranian 
warships passed a conditional line separating the Russian waters from Iranian, as in the
*■* This treaty sets the borderline between the USSR and Iran, which was more or less kept the same until 
the dissolution of the USSR.
‘ ‘^Traktat, Zakliuchionnyi v Turkmenchaie 10 Fevralia 1828 g .” Sbomik Dieistvuiushchikh Traktatov, 
Konventsii i Soglashenii, Zakliuchionnykh Rossiei s Drugimi Gosudarstvami i Kasaiushchikhsia 
Razlichnykh Voprosov Chastnago Mezhdunarodnago Prava V: 3 (S.Peterburg: 1891) 170.
Cynthia Croissant and Michael Croissant, ‘The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and 
Compromise,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region eds. Biilent Aras and Michael Croissant 
(Connecticut: Preager Publ., 2000), 22.
’’ “Obrashchenie Pravitelstva RSFSR k Pravitelstvu i Narodu Persii 26 liunia 1919 g.,” Dokumenty 
Vneshnei Politiki SSSR V: 2 (Moscow: 1958) 198-200.
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Russian-Iranian contracts, there are no indications about the order of navigation of the 
warships by the Caspian Sea and the flights over it. The Iranian warships have the right to 
float in the Soviet part of the Sea. Same applies to the Soviet warships.
Later on, the 1940 agreement supports the idea that the Caspian Sea was 
considered common for the warships just as the others. Article 13 of the agreement states 
that, the contracting parties decided that, in accordance with the 1921 agreement between 
RSFSR and Iran, only the ships of the contracting sides may navigate by the Caspian Sea.‘^
2. 3. 3. Military Navigational Practice
The ironic point in all the discussion on the military navigation by the Caspian Sea 
is the fact that Iran did not have any military fleet on the Caspian Sea at aU. Thus, the 
principle of freedom of military navigation did not become an effective and working rule. 
However, the following attitude of Riistem Memedov explains why the Russian lawyers 
were interested in changing the regulations of military regulation on the Caspian Sea: “Iran 
insists on literal interpretation of the specified contracts’ articles concerning the freedom of 
military navigation by the Caspian Sea. In case of existence of a military fleet in Iran, 
freedom of military navigation will enable the Iranian warships to freely float on the entire 
basin and in this way to threaten the political interests of the USSR. Thus it is possible to 
ascertain that the practice of military navigation by the Caspian Sea contradicts the rules
'* V. D. Logunov, “Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Rezhim Kaspiiskogo Morskogo Teatra,” Voenno-Morskoi 
Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Spravochnik (Moscow: 1966): 372-375.
“Dogovor o Torgovle i Moreplavanii Mezhdu Soiuzom Sovetskikh Cotsialisticheskikh Respublik i 
Iranom”, Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Konventsii, Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Pravil po Voprosam 
Torgovogo Moreplavaniia (Moscow: 1959) 268-269.
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established in the bilateral Russian-Iranian c on t r a c t s .H e  brings the fifth article of the 
1921 Contract to support his argument. According to the fifth Article of the 1921 
Contract, “the parties of the Contract decided not to permit on their own territories, 
formation or existence of organizations or groups or even separate identities standing with 
an aim of conflict against Russia and Iran or against their allies”.
The crucial point here is that this article seems to be aimed at preventing the 
hostile activities of third powers (outsiders) trying to gain power in the region, rather than 
the contracting parties. These third powers may be England, Turkey or another state, but it 
is a fact that with various strategic considerations at different periods of history a variety 
of states have been interested in the region and especially against the ‘expansion of Russia 
towards the warmer seas’, they manipulated Iran, or tried to gain positions on the Caspian 
region.^^ The first signs of a Soviet official anxiety on such a formation, was explicitly 
stated already in the 1919 declaration against British activities.^^ Therefore, the authors of 
the Contract perceived a possible threat from the third parties, rather than from one of the 
contracting sides.
Another failing detail in the above argument is that even if in the article it was 
accepted that threat was perceived to come from one of the contracting sides, the parties 
of the Contract, at that time, considered the Caspian as a ‘closed sea’, as will be described
Riistem Fahreddin Oğlı Memedov, “Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Rezhim Kaspiiskogo Moria” (Ph. D. 
diss. Kirov State University, Baku; 1988), 83.
“Dogovor Mezhdu RSFSR i Persiei 26 Fevralia 1921 g.,” Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki Rossii V: 3 
(Moscow: 1965) 727. The original text is as follows: “... storony uslovilis ni dopuskat na svoikh 
territoriiakh obrazavaniia ili prebyvaniia organizatsii ili grupp ili dazhe otdelnykh lits, stabiashchikh tseliu 
borbu protiv Irana i Rossii ili protiv soiuznykh s nimi gosudarstv.”
~~ See Bülent Gökay, ‘T he Battle for Baku (May-September 1918): a Peculiar Episode in the History of the 
Caucasus,” Middle Eastern Studies 1 (1998).
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in the following sections, and an area of common usage. Therefore, when the term ‘on 
their own territories’ was used, it is hardly possible that the parties considered the Caspian 
Sea area as any of their territories.
As a result of these evaluations, it is possible to conclude that the Caspian Sea 
was regarded as a basin open to the exploitation of both sides within the limits of the 
stipulations of the Contract. Therefore, both sides had the right to free military navigation 
by the Caspian Sea.
2. 4. Commercial Navigation
It is known that throughout history the Caspian Sea has been one of the key 
trading waterways of Russia. Especially after the invasion of Astrakhan and the Volga 
basin in 1556, the trade over the Caspian became a major source of the Russian 
economy.^“ Not only for Russia, but also for all its neighboring countries and nations, the 
Caspian Sea was a way of communication and commerce.
2. 4.1. Regulations on Commercial Navigation
The basis of the international regulation of commercial navigation by the Caspian 
Sea for the first time was incorporated by the Petersburg Treaty of 1723, as a result of the 
known campaign of Peter I to Persia. According to this treaty, the freedom of trade by the
Caspian Sea was established 25
“Obrashchenie Pravitelstva RSFSR k Pravitelstvu i Narodu Persii 26 liunia 1919 g.,” 199. 
^"Kurat, 280.
25 ,'GUI, 187.
14
As the Gülistan treaty is examined from the perspective of commercial 
navigation, the fifth article stated that, Russian trade vessels have the right to freely 
navigate by the Caspian Sea and when they are storm struck or shipwrecked, Persia will 
aid them in a friendly fashion. The same rights are also given to the Persian trade ships.^ ®
The Tiirkmengay treaty of 1828, in Article 8, renewed the same regulation
in the same wording.27
Although the 1921 agreement cancelled aU the earlier treaties between 
Russia and Persia, did not alter the regulation on commercial navigation by the Caspian 
Sea. In the agreement, it is stated that at the moment the agreement is signed, the 
contracting parties will have the same right to commercial navigation by the Caspian Sea 
as it is set in the eighth article of the Turkmen9ay Treaty of February 10, 1828.^ ®
The 1940 Contract has the most important place in the system of contracts 
regulating the international legal system of the commercial navigation by the Caspian Sea. 
The Contract sets an extended definition and description of the conditions and rules of 
navigation. Article 12 states that: ‘Trade ships, under the flag of one of the contracting 
parties, will be treated the same as the national trade ships in every respect, as they 
approach, stay and leave a port of the other party.”^^
“Mirnyi Traktat Mezhdu Rossiei i Persiei, Zakliuchionnyi v Golistane 12 Oktiabria 1813 Goda,” 104. 
‘Traktat, Zakliuchionnyi v Turkmenchaie lOFevralia 1828 g.,” 170.
“Dogovor Mezhdu RSFSR i Persiei 26 Fevralia 1921 g.,” 730.
“Dogovor 0 Torgovle i Moreplavanii Mezhdu Soiuzom Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i 
Iranom,” 268.
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2 .4 .2 . The Russian Anxiety
The legal regulations in all treaties recognize the right to free commercial 
navigation by the Caspian Sea. However, this principle was not completely practiced for 
the simple reason that the franian merchant marine fleet does not exist. Considering this 
fact, the Soviet lawyers expressed their anxieties over a possible argument from the franian 
side to activate the rules and regulations of the 1921 and 1940 agreements. The regime 
change in Iran increased these anxieties and a delimitation of the Caspian Sea was much 
strongly stressed by the Russian unofficial legal authorities.^®
In case of an franian attempt to build a merchant fleet by the Caspian Sea, it 
would have the right to navigate freely by the Caspian Sea according to the above- 
mentioned agreements. However, the Russian proposal brings the argument of the 
existence of a conditional borderline between Astara-Hasankuli to the agenda, though they 
themselves confirm that any kind of limitation has never been mentioned in the official 
agreements and contracts signed between Russia and Persia.^*
2. 5. Legal Status of the Sea; ‘Closed Sea’ or ‘Boundary Lake’
Until the beginning of the 19“* century, the legal status of the Caspian Sea was out 
of question. After the Russo-Persian treaties of Gülistan (1813) and Türkmençay (1828) 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea came to the agenda. Until the end of the Russian 
Empire, the status of the Caspian Sea was not a problem of any country other than its 
littoral states i.e. Russia and Persia, due to the absence of any serious problems in relation 
to it, and because of the undeveloped level of the international legal institutions of that
^°Memedov, 132.
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period. After the establishment of the Soviet rule, the status issue was not a concern of the 
outside countries, this time simply because of the completely closed structure of the Soviet 
Union. As a result, until the dissolution of the USSR, primarily the Russian scientists 
discussed the status issue. In this section, therefore, the Russian sources will be more 
frequently referred in order to follow how the status of the Sea was considered until the 
dissolution of the USSR.
2. 5.1. Earlier Comments on the Status of the Caspian
Although the status of the Caspian Sea first came to the agenda of the 
international legal practice at the beginning of the 19''' century, scholarly comments on the 
issue were made no earlier than the turn of the 20'*' century. One of the first comments on 
the issue from an international legal point of view was that of the Russian lawyer Fiodor 
Martens. Pointing to the status of the Sea after the Gülistan and Türkmençay treaties, he 
argued that, in comparison with the high seas, ‘a closed sea’ is surrounded by only one 
state and at the same time has no connection with the open seas. He developed his thesis 
on this basis, and concluded that the Caspian Sea, although it was surrounded not only by 
Russia but also by Persia, without any connection to the oceans, was a closed sea and had 
to be accepted as a Russian sea. Two other Russian lawyers defended the same approach 
in 1908 in the following way: “...closed or inland seas are the ones, which have no 
connection with oceans, but represents in itself the properties of a sea, but not a lake. The 
Caspian Sea, belonging to Russia, can be considered in this context.”^^  One should bear in 
mind that these comments are made at a time when the last legal document on the status of
31 Ibid.
Fiodor Martens, Sovremennoe Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo Tsivilizovannykh Narodov (S.Peterburg: 1904), 
385.
17
the Caspian was the Turkmengay treaty, according to which Russia was the sole power 
with the right to have a military fleet on the Caspian. This meant that Russia “owned the 
Sea”. Although such comments were made, it is hard to say that a common concept on 
international legal regime of the Caspian Sea was formalized before the 20'*' century.
2. 5. 2. The Official Approach: Caspian as a ‘Closed Sea’
As Russia’s all the former treaties were nullified by the Bolsheviks, so were the 
ones with Persia. The regime of the Caspian Sea was formulated in the Soviet-Persian 
Treaty of Friendship (28 February 1921). Although in this treaty there are many 
regulations concerning the exploitation of the Caspian Sea, it is impossible to assess how 
the sides considered the Caspian from a legal point of view, as a lake or a sea. However 
taking into account the following correspondence between the sides and the practice on 
the Sea, it may be concluded that the sides accepted the Caspian as a ‘closed sea’. In the 
first note from the Persian side to the Soviet government on 1 October 1927, the Caspian 
Sea was emphasized as being a ‘Soviet-Persian sea’.^ “* Considering the treaties and notes 
between the neighboring states of the Caspian, the status of the Caspian Sea is clearly 
recognized as a ‘closed sea’. The ‘Treaty on Trade, Navigation and Settlement” signed in 
1935 and the ‘Treaty on Trade and Navigation” of 1940 imply that the Caspian Sea is a
‘Soviet-Persian Sea’ 35
L. A. Komarovskii, V. A. Ulyanitskii, Mezhdumrodnoe Pravo (Moscow: 1908), 79.
Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (Moscow: 1965): 429.
Sbornik Mezhdunarodnykh Konventsii, Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Pravil po Voprosam Torgovogo 
Moreplavaniia (Moscow: 1959).
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At the same time, Artiele 12 of the 1940 Treaty sets a 10-mile fishing zone in the 
Caspian Sea. This, also, is an indication of that the contracting parties perceive the Caspian 
Sea as a ‘closed sea’ and make the regulations on the basis of this perception.^^
Some lawyers considered that the terms of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1940 did 
not apply the delimitation of the continental shelf and subsoil resources of the Caspian, 
which had to be done according to the international legal norms, if the Sea was accepted as 
a ‘closed sea’. However, this argument fails in considering the fact that the doctrine of the 
‘continental shelf did not come into being until the 1945 Truman Proclamation used the 
term in geographical means to indicate the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction beyond 
territorial waters^’; the exploitation of the subsoil resources of the Caspian did not come 
into consideration within the national interests of the contracting sides, until the end of the 
1940s.^ ® Therefore, it was historically impossible for the sides to apply these norms and
rules in the 1940 Contract 39
By the same token, the letter about the Caspian Sea, which was exchanged 
between the governments of Iran and the USSR dated 25 March 1940, stated “the Caspian
The 4“* item of the 12* Article reads as follows: “Apart from the previous regulations, the Contracting 
Sides reserve the right for the vessels bearing their own flags to fishing in their coastal waters, up to 10- 
miles, and reserve the right to give certain benefits to fish imports caught by the crew of the vessel bearing 
their own flags.”
Bernard Oxman, “Caspian Sea or Lake: What Difference Does It Make?,” Caspian Crossroads Magazin 
4(1996), <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepaees/usazerb/141.htm> (13 June 2000).
Gizzatov, 52.
For a discussion on the 1940 Treaty, see Kamyar Mehdiyoun, “Current Developments Ownership of Oil 
and Gas Resources in the Caspian,” The American Journal of International Law 1 (2000): 181. See also 
Henn-Jiiri Uibopuu, ‘The Caspian Sea: A Tangle of Legal Problems,” The World Today 6 (1995): 122.
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Sea, considered by both Contracting Sides as Soviet and Iranian Sea, represents an 
exclusive interest for the Contracting Sides.
2. 5. 3. The Reflections of the Official View on the Academic Publications
The acceptance of the Caspian Sea as a ‘closed sea’ not a ‘lake’ was so clear in 
these documents that this approach was recognized dogmatically by the Russian 
academics. In the legal works and in the law textbooks, the Caspian Sea was expressed as 
a ‘closed sea’ without any alternative. Already in 1940, in the “Handbook of Naval 
International Law”, it was marked that “the Caspian Sea, as geographically closed sea 
surrounded by two countries, Iran and the USSR, is considered as a Soviet-Iranian Sea.”“** 
In the textbook published in 1957 the Caspian Sea was accepted as a ‘closed sea’ as it had 
no connections with the high seas.“*^ In the ‘Handbook of Naval International Law’ 
published in 1966, Logunov, after a long discussion on whether the Caspian Sea is a 
‘closed sea’ or a ‘boundary lake’, concluded that Caspian Sea is a Soviet-Iranian sea.'*^  
Boitsov also agreed that actually being a closed sea-lake, as a result of the agreements 
between the neighboring countries, the Caspian Sea has to be considered as a Soviet- 
Iranian sea.'*'^
At the same time, the Iranian official approach was not much different. It was not 
only the speech of the diplomats or the notes in the correspondences, but moreover in the 
legislation of Iran this argument found its reflections. The municipal law of Iran recognized
Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dogovorov, Soglashenii i Konventsii, Zakliuchennykh SSSR s Inostrannymi 
Gosudarstvami (Moscow: 1956): 71-72.
Ed. V. A. Belli, Voenno-Morskoi Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Spravochnik (Moscow: 1940): 170.
F. I. Kozhevnikov, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo (Moscow: 1957): 222.
Logunov, 375.
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the Caspian Sea as a ‘closed sea’. In 1955 a note was added to the Article 2 of “The 
Iranian Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf Resources”: “As 
regards the Caspian Sea, the rules of international law relating to closed seas are 
apphcable.”“*^
Thus, the analysis carried out till this point indicates that according to the 
Russian-Iranian legal practice and the following Soviet and Iranian doctrines of 
international law, which engaged in solely the interpretation of the already accepted 
contractual norms and principals, the legal status of the Caspian Sea was accepted as a 
‘closed sea’.
2. 5. 4. Delimitation of ‘Closed Seas’ According to the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention
Accepting the legal status of the Caspian Sea as a ‘closed sea’ should have ended 
in delimitation of the sea. In delimitation of the closed seas, general practice is the 
application of the rules of the 1982 ‘Law of the Sea Convention’. According to Article 3 
of the 1982 Convention: “Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention.” Besides Article 33 states that: “The contiguous zone 
may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.” In addition, on the exclusive economic zone it is stated in the
F, S. Boitsov, Morskoe Pravo (Moscow: 1985): 46.
Mohammad Reza Dabiri, “Rezhime-e Hoghugi-e Daryay-e Khazar: Ameli Baray-e Tavazon Manafeh va 
Tavazon Amniyat” [‘The Caspian’s Legal Regime: Balancing National Interests and National Security”], 
Majalleh (Summer 1995): 141, 144, quoted in Kamyar Mehdiyoun, “Current Developments Ownership of 
Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian,” The American Journal of International Law 1 (2000): 181.
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1982 Convention that: “The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”“^
The application of the international legal norms would result in a situation in 
which, the Caspian Sea would be regarded as a common sea, beyond the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone, on which both neighboring states could conduct all kinds of activities 
within the regulations of the international conventions.
2. 5. 5. The Practice in the Caspian Sea during the Soviet Period
Accepting the rules of the 1982 Convention was disadvantageous for the Soviet 
side. Although commissions, working on the definition of the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea and afterwards on its delimitation, were established immediately after the 1921 treaty 
and worked in tens of sessions untU 1950s for a decision, it was impossible for the 
negotiating sides to reach an agreement as the sides had clashing interests.'*’
Without any delimitations, the Soviet Union was taking advantage of the 
uncertainty in the legal practice. Although the activities of the Soviet Union were not 
conducted in the southern sections of the Sea'*®, there was no official limiting border for 
the USSR. Besides, the Iranian side, having enough resources in its southern part, did not 
dare dealing with the Soviet Union, which was the superpower of the period, for such an 
issue, which had not yet a strategic priority for Iran. Leaving aside conflicting with the
United Nations; Art. 15.
Memedov, 60.
22
USSR, Iran stayed silent, keeping the legal basis, established under the above-mentioned 
legal activities, for delimitation of the Sea, thus putting off the opportunity to exploit the 
resources resting under the Sea, commonly with its northern neighbor in a future time.
A dispute, which started in 1970s and accelerated with the revolution in Iran, to 
resume the question in such a way to conclude in advantageous position for the Soviet 
Union, regarding the fact that the application of the legal responsibilities on the Caspian 
Sea, such as the delimitation of the sea into territorial waters and contiguous zones, would 
also practically give the same freedom to the Iranian part, although there did not seem a 
possible Iranian initiative by the Caspian Sea in the near future. The argument was that the 
Caspian Sea should be considered as a lake, ‘boundary lake’, neighboring more than one 
country. Consequently, the delimitation would be realized in accordance with the general 
practice of the delimitation of lakes, dividing the Sea with a line so that each state would 
have its share, on which it could exercise sovereignty. In this way, there would be no place 
for any kind of common exploitation, and each party would exploit its own sector, as it 
liked. In this kind of delimitation of the Sea, however, the Soviet sector would be much 
bigger than the Iranian sector.
2. 5. 6. Inclination to ^Boundary Lake’ status
In time, the above-mentioned politic anxiety found its supporters among the 
lawyers. It was more commonly argued that the Caspian Sea was actually a ‘boundary 
lake’, and the Caspian Sea should be delimited in accordance with this status. Giil openly
In fact, the reason for Russia not to exploit oil of the southern sector, not its respect to the rights of Iran, 
but the practical difficulty in conducting exploitation in the southern part of the Caspian, as this section 
contains the greatest depths of the Caspian.
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characterized the Caspian as a lake: “The Caspian Sea, the biggest lake in the world, due 
to its size and saltiness, in the ancient times took the name ‘sea’.”'*^
Memedov defended the same argument, supporting himself with many Russian 
lawyers, such as Zhudro, Volkova and Bekiasheva. He argued that a sea surrounded by 
two or more states and which had no access to the high seas is not a sea, but a ‘boundary 
lake’. He also clearly put forward the conflict between the international legal status of the 
Sea with its consideration as a ‘closed sea’ in the agreements between Soviet Union and 
Iran. Interestingly, he was quite anxious about the Iranian activities on the Caspian Sea. 
Although he admitted the fact that according to the 1921 and 1940 treaties between the 
sides on freedom of navigation, he adds the following: “In our opinion in case of formation 
of a fishing fleet of Iran at the southern coast of the Caspian, then there may be claims on 
Iran’s right to freedom of fishing in the Soviet waters of the Caspian.” ®^
In the following pages of his research Memedov, after mentioning that Soviet 
Union started extraction of oil and gas on the offshore basins in the Caspian Sea as early as 
1950, he refers to the Iranian demand in 1987 on cooperation with the Soviet Union in the 
field of development of oil and gas deposits in a southern part of the Sea. He commented 
on this demand in the following way: “On the first sight there is nothing abnormal and 
problematic. Based on the principle of cooperation Soviet Union helps Iran. However, it is 
necessary to take into account that Iran plans in the near future to extract oil and gas 
independently in the Caspian Sea and now, with this purpose, buys the necessary 
equipment for its future use. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider the fact that oil
49 GUI, 12.
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and gas resources are gradually exhausted and in the near future the Caspian basin will 
become a major source of these mineral resources for the Soviet Union and for Iran.”^^  As 
it is clearly stated in these above sentences, the Soviet Union had never any problem with 
Iran in its exploitation of the resources in the Caspian basin. That is to say, Iran never took 
a position against Russian interests in the Sea.^  ^ However, the Soviet side increasingly 
became more suspicious of an increase in Iran’s assertions on its right to freedom of 
navigation on the Caspian Sea.
2. 5. 7. The USSR’s Growing Anxieties on Iran’s Intentions
In order to understand the Russian anxiety despite the Iranian tameness, the 
contemporary geopohtical condition has to be taken into account. During the Shah period, 
while Iran was an ally of USA, the possible threat for the Soviet Union could be a mihtary 
settlement supported by the USA on the shores of the Caspian. Such a possibihty was 
prevented before it was reahzed, through the correspondence between the governments of 
the two httoral states of the Caspian. Besides, during the Shah period, Iran neither entered 
into a project on exploiting the Caspian resources itself, nor reacted against the Soviet 
involvements. The only sign of reaction to the Soviet exploitation of the sea resources, if it 
could be counted as a reaction, was put forward in a very polite manner: “We do not 
oppose the Soviet exploitation of the Caspian oil resources, but should not it have 
informed the Iranian side about that?”^^
^°Memedov, 51-53.
Ibid, 62-63.
It should be noted that, the Iranian passivity in the Caspian Sea was one of the main reasons for the 
continuity of the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea during the Soviet period.
A. Dowlatchahi, La Mer Caspienne (Paris: 1961): 187, quoted in Memedov, 63.
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With the change of the regime in Iran, its policy on the Caspian Sea was also 
altered shghtly. After the Islamic revolution, Iran pursued a more active policy and 
asserted its right to freedom of navigation and fishing (in reference to the 1940 treaty), 
though it did not claim any right to exploit the oil resources for the time being. 
Considering Iran’s rising interest in the Caspian Sea and in its resources, the Russian 
lawyers and politicians seemed to incline toward a legal establishment of the status 
question through which Iran would be prevented from free navigation above the southern 
part of the Caspian. Thus, the Russian lawyers implied to delimit the Caspian Sea by 
drawing a direct line between the two exits of the borderlines on both costs of the Caspian 
Sea, and in this way to separate the southern sector of the Caspian Sea, which remained 
below the Astara - Hasankuh line, from the northern and bigger part, which would be 
under full-sovereignty of the Soviet Union.
Shortly, all the above-mentioned official documents considering the USSR- 
Iranian relations, thus the legal-history of the Caspian Sea, indicate that the Sea was 
accepted by its neighboring states as a ‘closed sea’. However, it should also be borne in 
mind that, the discussions on the status of the Sea did not come to an end. On the 
contrary, it increased as the contracts, regulating the activities by the Caspian, became day 
by day out-of-date and as the Iranian interests came to the fore with its serious attempts to 
exploit the Caspian resources.
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CHAPTER III
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA AFTER 1991
After the dissolution of the USSR, three more states emerged as the littoral states 
of the Caspian Sea. Until 1991, the legal status of the Sea did not consist a serious 
problem causing a regional political crisis, let alone at the international level. Together 
with the emergence of the newly independent states and their opening into the international 
oil market, however, the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea to the regional and 
then to the international agenda. Some of these newly independent littoral states, in a brief 
period, signed agreements with the western oil companies on finding, extracting and 
managing the oil and gas beneath the Caspian, which they assumed in their countries’ 
sectors of the Sea. These unilateral actions provided the grounds for the legal dispute to 
emerge.
3.1. The Legal Status Dispute as a Determining Factor
It may seem that the legal aspect is not the main cause of the disagreements 
among the httoral states. However, the dimensions of the problems caused by the 
ambiguity in the legal status of the Caspian Sea require a deeper analysis of the problem.
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The essentiality of the legal status issue emanates from the vast resources beneath 
the Sea. The figures indicating the richness of the oil and gas reserves explain that the prize 
is too big to be ignored. If the giant oil resources beneath the Sea and the wars for oil 
throughout history are considered together, it will be simpler to figure out how significant 
to acquire one more km  ^on the seabed for the httoral states of the Caspian Sea.^ "*
In this new ‘Great Game’ the enormous economic interests of all players, which 
are at risk in the determination of the status of the Caspian basin, makes the issue much 
more critical for the economic and pohtical future of the region. Therefore, each littoral 
state proposes the solution for the ambiguity in the legal status of the Caspian Sea, in a 
way serving to its economic interests best. In order to understand why the ambiguity has 
become so decisive in the region’s politics, the magnitude of the region’s economic 
potential has to be illustrated. Accordingly, before analyzing the standpoints of each littoral 
state in this legal status discussion, a brief look at the potential wealth of the region will be 
taken.
3. 2. The Potential in the Region
The oil potential of the newly independent states has attracted the representatives 
of large and small oil companies and foreign government officials who have been trekking 
to this region to gain access to its energy reserves. Nevertheless, the pessimistic side of an 
ongoing debate over the amount of the mineral resources of the region argues that the 
figures about the oil and gas reserves are exaggerated. Moreover, they claim that the
54 See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (London: Simon and Schuster,
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Caspian Sea oil does not dear investing in. Then the question arises: "How much is the 
wealth?”
3. 2.1. Speculations on the Oil Reserves
Measuring the Caspian wealth is difficult. One difficulty in reaching exact values 
of the oil reserves is the clashing comments and gossips over the issue. About only the 
Azerbaijani portion of the oil, no amount can be declared exactly and reliably. Some of the 
Azerbaijani oil experts claim that Azerbaijan has as much as 20 billion tons onshore and 78 
billion tons offshore. On the other hand, some experts working for US Department of 
Energy argue that in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea, 30 billion tons 
(approximately 200 billion barrels) of oil exists.^  ^ Another statement claims that 
Azerbaijan's proven oil reserves are estimated at 11 billion barrels.^^ Thus, the estimations 
of only the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea oil reserves vary between 1,5 to 30 
billion tons.^’
The gap among the estimations for whole the Caspian’s oil potential is higher. 
UExpress, a journal published in France, wrote the Caspian has from 70 to 250 billion 
barrels of oil; at the Khazarneftegaz-97 exhibition experts operated with a figure of 200 
billion barrels; the Ekspert journal of Russia estimated the Caspian resources as 7 to 8
1991).
“Resource Development at the Caspian Sea Region,” US Department o f Energy, 1 August 2000 
<http://www,eia.doe.gov/emeu/finance/usi&to/caspian.html> (2 August 2000).
■'** Jan Adams, "Pipelines and Pipedreams," Problems of Post-Communism 5 (1998), 26.
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billion tons of oil, while the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic held that only 
the republic has about 4 billion tons of oH.^ * On the other hand, according to Wood 
Mackenzie, a consultancy, the Caspian basin has 28 bbl (billion barrels) oil of proven 
reserves and 243 trillion cubic feet of gas, equivalent to almost 70 bbl oil.^ ^
The uncertainty in measurements is not merely because of the geological 
obstacles, which makes measuring troublesome, but rather caused by the regional states' 
and the actors’ benefits in it. The Southern Tier states have considerable interests in 
keeping estimates high in order to maintain their attractiveness to outside investment.^® It 
is dreadful for them to even think of any falsifying evidence to emerge, which shows that 
the oil does not worth extracting. Such pessimistic arguments are made by way of the high 
costs of pipeline projects and the low oil prices in the world market, taking the current 
(Chechnya, Abkhazia, Karabag) and possible conflicts and obstacles into consideration.^* 
While the regional political elite tries to exaggerate the potential of the region to profit 
from the higher share prices of the exploitation and transportation of the oil, the oil 
companies engaging in the Caspian oil race also manipulate the statistics through their 
expert groups. Leaving aside all these unproven speculations and rumors, the data taken 
from US Government Energy Information Administration will be heeded in the following 
(although their objectivity is open to discussion).
Hasan Kuliev, “Myths and Realities: Oil Strategy of Azerbaijan,” Central Asia and Caucasus, No. 1, 
2000. < http://www.ca-c.org/iournal/eng01 2000/12.kuliev.shtml> (15.05.2000).
Ibid.
“Oil Drums Calling.” The Economist (7 February 1998): 5.
“  Ian Bremmer, “Oil Politics.” World Policy Journal 1 (1998): 27.
30
3. 2. 2. Reserves of the Littoral States
The Baku oil fields were the world's largest oU producer at the turn of the 
century, but despite their impressive reserves, they fell to the thirty-fifth place by 1997. 
The country's proven oil reserves are estimated between 3,6 billion barrels of oil (bbl) and 
12,5 bbl. Together with 32 billion barrels of estimated amount, totally, it has 
approximately 36-45 billion barrels. It is close to one third of Kuwait's reserves. Besides, 
Azerbaijan has 0,3 trillions of cubic meters (trillions of m^ ) of proven gas reserves. When 
the estimated gas reserve of 1 trillion cubic meters is added, Azerbaijan owns 1,3 trillions 
cubic meters gas reserves. However, in order to profit from these vast resources 
Azerbaijan, like the other oil-rich non-Russian former Soviet republics, must rely on 
Western oil companies for capital and technical help and still depends on Russia's pipelines 
to reach global markets, until new pipehne projects are decided and put into use.
With proven gas reserves of 101 trillions of m^ , Turkmenistan ranks behind only 
Russia and Iran. The largest natural gas fields are in the Amu-Darya basin, with half of the 
country's gas reserves are located in the giant Dauletabad-Donmez field. Together with 1,7 
bbl of proven and 80 bbl of estimated oil reserves, roughly 82 bbl of oil in total, it has a 
potential to be the Kuwait of the Caspian region.
After Russia, Kazakstan is the second largest oil producer in the CIS, yielding 
520,000 b/d in 1996. Most of the oil is located in the northwestern Kazakstan, in the rich
61 Olcott, p. 94.
31
Tengiz and Uzen oil fields. Tengiz is one of the ten largest oil fields in the world, with 
proven high quality reserves of 10 to 17,6 billion barrels. Seismic profile (which was 
completed by the Kazakstan Caspi Shelf (KCS) consortium) of the Kazakh zone of the 
Caspian seabed indicated that offshore areas of the Caspian could contain 60 billion barrels 
of possible reserves. The figure for the total amount, according to the US Energy 
Information Administration (ElA) exceeds 100 bbl. Kazakstan's oil wealth is accompanied 
by large natural gas reserves, proven 1,5 trillions cubic meters and estimated 2,5 trillions
cubic meters 63
While Russia, as the old superpower of the region, argued for a long time that all 
the resources of the region should be exploited commonly, considering its share in case of 
a division into sectors, it has 2,7 bbl proven oil reserves alongside 14 bbl unproven.^“*
Besides, the current statistics indicate that the lesser country in terms of proven 
oil reserves in the region is Iran with its 0,1 bbl proven reserves. However, it has at least 
15 bbl possible oil reserves in the southern part of the Caspian Sea.^^
The Caspian Sea is becoming an important region (and increasingly more 
substantial) for the world oil markets once again, this time by potentially becoming another
Adams, p. 32.
US Energy Information Administration, “Caspian Sea Region”, Country Analysis Briefs, June 2000, 
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspfulI.html> (05 July 2000).
^  Ibid.
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non-OPEC source, similar to North Sea oil, with its more than 250 bbl oil resources. The 
world consumers are consequently trying to accommodate this new participant with new 
ties from export pipelines to security agreements. However, this is not a trouble-free 
process. One of the primary sources of these disagreements is the ambiguity in the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea. As a reflection of the clashing economic and political interests of 
the littoral states, the standpoint of each state on the issue is also clashing. Indeed, a deep 
analysis points out how much these standpoints are related with the interests of the states, 
and how much thek proposals have altered in time, as thek political and economic 
considerations and priorities have transformed.
3. 3. The Positions of the Littoral States after 1991
Before describing the positions of each littoral state in regards to the legal status 
of the Caspian Sea, the ambiguity in thek standpoints and in the evaluations of thek points 
of view has to be explained.
Indeed, it is hard to determine clearly, which state defends which position by 
following the statements of any state official or by monitoring the news agents. It is hard 
to say that the consequences of defending any position are well understood by each side of 
the dispute. Even among the declarations of one state, there are so many contradictions 
that it needs a special analysis of the declarations of each state to extract its point of view
65 Ibid.
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with reference to the legal status of the Caspian Sea. A selection from the speeches of 
officials might demonstrate the dimensions of the present ambiguity and contradictions.
3 .3 .1 . Contradictory Official Statements
Regarding the contradictions among the Russian statements, three different 
positions were defended by the Russian official in various cases. As early as June 1994, 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin stated that: “Our position is that... 
by nature, the Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single eco-system....” ®^ 
However prior to the Almaty Conference, Russian Foreign Ministry explained Russia’s 
approach as accepting the Caspian as ‘an isolated intercontinental salt lake’.^  ^ On the 
Russian Foreign Ministry’s letter to British Embassy dated 28 April 1994, it was stated 
that the Caspian Sea has to be accepted as an ‘enclosed sea’. As the third variant, 
according to the Moscow Interfax news agency, the deputy director of Russian Foreign 
Ministry’s Asia Department Maksim Peshkov stated on 21 December 1995 that: “From the 
point of view of international law the Caspian Sea is not a sea but a lake, one cannot apply 
such notions of the international sea law such as territorial sea, territorial shelf etc.” ®^
On the other hand, while Azerbaijan is known as the most determined opponent 
of the Russian view, the contradictory statements of the Azerbaijani officials were no less 
confusing. During the Ashgabat meeting, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov set
“Russia not blocking Caspian oil deal - Azeri leader,” Reuters Business Briefing, 8 June 1994. 
“Russia Opposes Baku Position on Caspian Sea,” FBIS-SOV-95-095, 16 May 1995.
** “Moscow 'Does Not Recognize' Division of Caspian Sea,” FBIS-SOV-95-246, 21 December 1995.
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the Azerbaijani position in the following way: ‘The Caspian Sea is a border lake like the 
Great Lakes between the United States and Canada. The traditional use of the Caspian Sea 
and the implementation of sovereign rights to ownership of its relevant sectors cannot be 
made dependent on the collective solution of the question of the Caspian Sea’s legal 
status.”®^ Today the position of Azerbaijan is accepted by many researchers as that the 
Caspian Sea is a ‘sea’ to which the norms of the International Law of the Sea Convention 
have to be applied. This misunderstanding is a consequence of the contradictory 
statements of some other officials of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry. For instance, on 16 
May 1995, during the Almaty Conference, Halef Halefov, the chief of the Legal 
Management in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry, relating to the proximity of the approaches 
of Kazakstan and Azerbaijan to the legal status issue, stated that: “Azerbaijan and 
Kazakstan stand for the division of the Caspian into sectors and substantiate their position 
by the norms of the international law. Kazakstan and Azerbaijan come out for absolute 
sovereignty of the Caspian littoral countries on their national sectors on the Caspian Sea. 
This position is based on the international marine law and it is supported by the 
international experts.’’™ Halefov’s words imply that Azerbaijan, as Kazakstan, accepts the 
Caspian Sea as a ‘sea’, because firstly Kazakstan’s argument is in that direction and 
secondly, the international marine law can only be applied if it is accepted as ‘sea’, as there 
are no regulations for ‘lakes’.
® “Ministers Cited on Caspian Sea Status,” FBIS-SOV-96-240,1 December 1996. 
“Russia Opposes Baku Position on Caspian Sea,” FBIS-SOV-95-095, 16 May 1995.
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On the other hand, the statements of Iranian officials are no less contradictory. 
While the Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami told at the Almaty summit that Tehran 
continued to regard the Caspian as the world’s biggest lake’\  Iranian Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Valayeti, called the Caspian as the world’s largest ‘inland sea’.’  ^Besides, National 
Iranian Oil Company official in charge of oil extraction, Mehdi Huseini, also defined the 
Caspian as ‘inland sea’, but not an ‘open sea’.’^
3. 3. 2. Contradictory Assessments of News Agencies and Researchers
These contradictory statements from the directly responsible officials, naturally, 
find their reflections in the commentaries and analysis of both the media and academics. 
Definitely, both he media and academics often give extremely confusing information on the 
subject. While Reuters, in its almost every news report on the Caspian Sea’s legal status 
added the commenting information that Russia and Iran had long argued that the Caspian 
Sea is a ‘lake’, while the newly independent states of the region, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan 
and Turkmenistan had argued that it was a ‘sea’, which should be carved into sectors. '^*
“Kazakhstan President Insists on Caspian Delimitation,” FBIS-SOV-98-131, 11 May 1998.
“Velayati Calls Caspian Sea "Common Heritage" of Littoral States,” 23 October 1996, 
<http;//www.netiran.com/search.html> (3 July 2000).
“Iran-Caspian Sea Iranian Proposal on Caspian Sea Legal Regime Conforms to International Law,” 28 
October 1995, <http://www.netiran.com/search.html> (4 July 2000).
“Russia Says Oil-Rich Caspian Status Not Resolved,” Reuters Business Briefing, 01 February 1996.
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On the other hand, Itar-Tass stated that Russia and Iran had close approaches to 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea as accepting it as a ‘sea’.’  ^The Tehran Times also gives 
the information that Iran and Russia in the same opinion defending the position that the 
Caspian is a ‘lake’, and the other littoral states argue that the Caspian is a ‘sea’. At the 
same time the APS {Arab Press Service) proposes a totally distinctive argument that Iran 
regards the Caspian as ‘lake’, and Russia, by 1998, has agreed to accept the water 
reservoir as a ‘sea’ rather than a ‘lake’, and that Turkmenistan and Iran share more or less 
the same positions.^^ However, Iran News states that: ‘Tehran prefers to maintain the 
status of the Caspian as a ‘sea’.”’’ Besides Azer-Press insistently implies, regarding the 
method of division of the Caspian, that Azerbaijan refers to the relevant articles of the Law 
of the Sea Convention. This means that Azerbaijan accepts the jurisdiction of the Law of 
the Sea Convention, which means accepting the Caspian as a ‘sea’.’*
Adding the inconsistencies of the new agencies to the contradictory statements of 
the officials, and overall considering the changes of the state policies with respect to the 
status of the Caspian Sea in time, the highly conflictual assessments of the academicians 
and commentators on the issue are more understandable. However, attempts to understand 
the positions of the sides of the issue just through these assessments will obviously fail. As
“Kazakhstan: Working Group To Determine Status of Caspian Sea,” FBIS-SOV-97-142, 22 May 1997.
“Legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” APS Review, 06 July 1998.
’’ ‘T he Caspian Rising as Its Health Deteriorates,” Iran News, 16 April 1995.
In a report of the Azer Press, while commenting on the position of Azerbaijan as to the division of the 
Caspian Sea, it was stated that: “Azerbaijan refers to articles 5, 7, 8, 10 and 15 of UN Maritime Law  
Convention. It is claimed here that the sea can only be divided by the middle line, each point of which 
should be equally distanced from the nearest points of the coastlines.” This statement is wrongly 
understood by some researches as that Azerbaijan is defending the ‘sea’ position of the Caspian. However, 
the reference is made as to the regulations of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the median line
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regards the Russian stand on the issue, Barsegov claimed that Russia accepts the Caspian 
as a ‘closed sea’7  ^Scott Horton does not agree with the idea at his speech presented at a 
conference on “The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas and Ecology in the Caucasus and Caspian 
Basin.” He defends that Russia views the Caspian as ‘an international lake’. Another 
research refers to the Russian argument as that the Caspian Sea should be accepted as an 
‘enclosed sea’ or a ‘closed lake’.** On the other hand, it is argued by many researches that 
the Russian argues the ‘lake’ status of the Caspian.*  ^ Besides, there is another argument 
that Russia, escaping from a well described definition, claims the Caspian neither a ‘sea’
nor a ‘lake’, but an ‘inland water’.83
On the other hand, as to the stand of Iran, while an Iranian monthly argues that 
the Caspian Sea, which was ones a ‘lake’, has turned into a ‘sea’ in time and now has to be 
accepted a ‘sea’,*“* another Iranian daily argues that the Caspian Sea is a ‘lake’ and 36 
percent of this lake is Iran’s share.*^
principle. “Ashkhabat Hopes for a Prompt Consensus on the Status of the Caspian,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 20 July 1999.
’’ lu. G. Barsegov, Kaspii v Mezhdunarodnom Brave i Mirovoi Politike (Moscow: 1998), 30-33.
Scott Horton, “International Law Ownership of the Caspian Seabed,” CIS Law Notes, September 1998, 
<http://www.pbwt.ru/Resources/index.html> (29 June 2000).
Burcu Çevik, “The Status of the Caspian Sea: An Inquiry into the Issue of Delimitation” (Ph.D. diss. 
Middle East Technical University, 1998), 43.
See Croissant and Croissant, 22, Gülnar Nugman, ‘The legal Status of the Caspian Sea,” Eurasian 
Studies, 13 (1998) 85, Yuri Fedorov, “Russia’s Policies toward Caspian Region Oil: Neo-Imperial or 
Pragmatic?” September 1996, <http://www.cpss.org/casianw/fedorov.htm> (30 June 2000), U. T. 
Kasenov, “Kaspiiskaia Neft, Truboprovody i Mezhdunarodnaia Bezopastnost,” Kaspiiskaia Neft i 
Mezhdunarodnaia Bezopastnost’ (Moscow, 1996), 59.
F, Kovalev, “Caspian Oil: Russian Interests,” International Affairs 3 (1997), 49. Mehdiyoun states that 
Russia accepts the Caspian as ‘a landlocked body of water’, in Mahdiyoun, 185. Also see Elbar Kerimov, 
“Mezhdunarodnoi Pravovoi Status Kaspiiskoe More,” (Ph.D. diss. St. Petersburg University, 1999), 23-28 
and Witt Raczka, “A Sea or a Lake? The Caspian’s Long Odyssey,” Central Asian Survey 19 (2000), 209.
“Shipping, Oil, ad Fishing Share in the Caspian,” Sanat-e Haml-o Naql, 158 (1996), 47-49, cited in 
Iran News.
“25% of Russia’s Sewage Enters the Caspian Sea,” Hamshahri, 1 March 1995, 7, cited in Iran News.
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3. 3. 3. ‘Legal status’ or ‘legal regime’
The interests of the littoral states are not directly related with the status of the 
Caspian Sea, but rather related with the legal regime applied in the Sea, which will be 
decided as a result of the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The legal regime refers to the 
practical apphcation of the legal status, i.e. how the legal status will be applied, aceording 
to which rules and laws. In the Caspian Sea case many types of legal regimes have been 
disputed, from dividing into national sectors over which full-state-sovereignty would be 
apphed to common usage of the Sea leaving only 10-mile territorial waters for fishing and 
navigational purposes. That is to say, whether the Sea will be divided among the littoral 
states, or not; if divided how it will occur, are the main questions. However, these 
questions will be decided according to the decision over the legal status of the Caspian. As 
a result, the officials of the littoral states have been concerned more with the legal regime 
of the Caspian Sea than with its legal status.
The arguments for the Sea’s legal status are no more than expedients for backing 
their positions on the legal regime of the Caspian. Therefore, although a particular state’s 
officials claim different approaches to the legal status of the Caspian, they never defend 
different positions on the legal regime of the Caspian.
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The positions of the littoral states concerning the legal regime of the Sea have 
never been ambiguous. For instance, although students of the issue contradicted with each 
other as some of them argued that Russia accepted the Caspian Sea as a ‘lake’ while some 
others claimed the Russian view as calling the Caspian a ‘sea’, there seems to be a 
consensus about the Russia’s wish that the Caspian Sea be accepted as a common property 
of all the littoral states. While many researches conflicted over the nature of the 
Azerbaijani approach to the legal status debate (whether it supports the ‘lake’ or the ‘sea’ 
argument), aU of them accepted that Azerbaijan wanted the Sea to be delimited on a 
sectoral basis. Thus, the approaches of each littoral state should be analyzed in reference to 
their arguments on the legal regime of the Caspian Sea alongside their arguments on the 
legal status dispute.*^
3. 3. 4. Russia
During the first meeting of the representatives of the littoral states to deal with 
the Caspian Sea’s problems -then the status issue was not dwelled on as the oil extraction 
contracts were not on the agenda- the Russian argument was that the Caspian Sea was an 
‘enclosed sea’. According to the Russian position, the Caspian states could have their 
territorial waters and the middle area of the Caspian Sea would be the common property of 
aU the littoral states.*’ This argument followed the regulations of the 1940 Contract.
Realizing this fact, the officials of the littoral states have more inclined to discuss the legal regime of the 
Caspian Sea, postponing the disputes on how the legal status should be defined.
Gorhmaz Askarov, “Border Games in the Caspian Sea: Newly Independent States vs. Russia and Iran 
Co.,” Caspian Crossroads Magazin 2 (1999)
<http://ourworld.comDUserve.com/homepages/usazerb/423.htm> (28 January 2000).
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However, Russia did not need a long time to realize the disadvantage of defending this 
argument for its interests.
Accepting the Caspian Sea a ‘sea’ meant that the rules of the Law of the Sea 
Convention of 1982 have to be applied. According to the Law of the Sea Convention 
every littoral state of an ‘enclosed sea’, has the right to set ‘internal waters’, ‘territorial 
waters’, ‘continental shelf and ‘exclusive economic zone’. Considering that the Caspian 
Sea is not that large, the application of the above mentioned settings meant the 
delimitation of the Sea according to the ‘median line’ principle.
The relevant article of the Law of the Sea Convention stated that: “Where the 
coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is 
entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea 
beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is 
measured.”®*
Besides, accepting the Caspian a ‘sea’ from the legal point of view, would give 
the other littoral states, which had no outlet to the high seas, right to freely navigate over 
the Volga-Don and Don-Baltic channels. If the rules of the 1982 Convention are applied to 
the Caspian Sea, then Russia has to accept the status of the stated channels as international
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waterways, thus has to open the Caspian Sea to other states.*  ^Reahzing these geopolitical 
disadvantages of claiming the Caspian a ‘sea’, Russia quickly gave up this argument.
It is also not advantageous for Russia to argue that the Caspian Sea is a ‘lake’. 
There are no regulatory rules or laws in international law regarding the lakes. However, 
the international custom is to divide the international border lakes among its littoral states. 
There are many examples of such divisions: Lake Victoria (among Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda), Lake Malawi (between Malawi and Mozambique), the Great Lakes of North 
America (between Canada and the United States), Lake Titicaca (between Bolivia and 
Peru), and Lake Geneva (between France and Switzerland).Dividing these lakes into 
sectors gives the littoral states exclusive sovereign rights over their sectors as state 
territory. There is only one exceptional case in which the border lake was not divided into 
sectors among the littoral states, but was set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as 
a common property of the surrounding states and is referred to as a condominium: the 
Gulf of Fonseca.^^ Russia could insist on the application of the Gulf of Fonseca case to the 
Caspian Sea, and thus a condominium to be established. Nevertheless, the Gulf of Fonseca 
is a unique case. After all, it is not a “lake”, or an “enclosed sea”, but a wide-open gulf. 
Moreover, the other examples of delimitation of waters are so common that it is often said
** United Nations, Part 2 Article 15.
See Uibopuu, 120 and V. Aleksandrov, “Caspian Oil; Blessing or Curse?,” International Affairs 6 
(1997): 76.
®°Memedov, 145-147.
Ibid.
The Gulf of Fonseca is enclosed by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. The ICJ declared that the 
waters of the Gulf are shared by the three coastal countries as a condominium and each government has 
the right to declare 3-mile strip of territorial waters along their coasts.
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that equidistance delimitation of lakes and inland seas is a general rule of international
law.92
As a result of these considerations, although there exist some contradictory 
official statements, it has been generally accepted the current official position of the 
Russian Federation in regards to the Caspian Sea, as stated in various ways, is that it 
should be recognized as one of these: ‘enclosed water reservoir’^ ,^ ‘inland basin’, ‘inland 
water’,^ ‘* ‘closed water pool’.^  ^ Referring to the Caspian Sea in this way Russia officially 
aimed at escaping from giving a concrete description of the sea, such as naming it simply 
as a ‘sea’ or a ‘lake’, thereby rejecting all the regulations set by the International Law of 
the Sea, and laying the groundwork for a unique legal regime to be implemented in the 
Caspian Sea.
As for the Russian approach about the legal status of the Caspian Sea, it has to be 
noted that Russia, being the natural and legal successor of USSR, thus one of the sides of 
the previous treaties and contracts regarding the Caspian Sea, claimed the validity of the 
previous agreements between USSR and Iran, as these agreements were not rescinded 
formally. Although Russia accepted that these documents were not adequate in regulating
Brice Clagett, “Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil Resources in the Caspian Sea under the Rules of 
International Law,” Caspian Crossroads Magazine 3 (1995) 
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/423.htin> (28 January 2000).
^^Referred to the Caspian Sea as such many times by Russian Foreign Minister Karasin, also in: “Russia 
Stakes Claim to Caspian Sea Oil Resources,” Reuters Business Briefing, 2 June 1994.
Referred to the Caspian Sea as such by Russian Deputy Minister for Fuel and Energy Vadim 
Dvurechensky in: “Russian Minister Calls for Caspian Sea Oil Talks,” Reuters Business Briefing, 24 
March 1995.
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the contemporary issues and problems of the Caspian Sea, until new regulations and 
agreements would be reached with the consensus of all the littoral states, the previous 
agreements had to be in force. The agreements between USSR and Iran officially gave 
both sides the right to have a 10-mile zone of territorial waters. Thus, in line with this, 
Russia claimed that aU the Caspian Sea httoral states would have the right to have 10-mile 
zone of territorial waters and nothing more. The remaining part of the Caspian Sea would 
be under the common ownership of all httoral countries.
It should be added that although the Russian approach to the legal regime of the 
Caspian Sea has changed many times until 1993, its approach to the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea has not changed. The above-mentioned description of the legal status gives 
Russia to justify all its legal regime proposals. Its definition of the legal status was the 
same when it defended that the Caspian Sea cannot be divided and should be accepted 
under the joint sovereignty of the httoral states, and when its position has changed to 
stating that the seabed may be divided, but the water surface has to be under joint 
management.
The conflict among the domestic pohtical organs of the Russian Federation was 
obvious in the change of its approach to the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. However, 
this change has not found its reflection in the definition of the Caspian Sea as the wording
Referred to the Caspian Sea as such in the Russian letter to the UN on 8 October 1994. “Moscow Warns 
Against Unilateral Actions in Caspian,” FBIS-SOV-94-196, 8 October 1994.
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of the definition as an ‘inland water basin’ gives Russia the opportunity to change its legal 
regime approach within the same conceptualization.^^
3. 3. 5. Azerbaijan
Regarding Azerbaijan’s position in the legal status dispute, the main point is that 
Azerbaijan insisted on the ‘lake’ status of the Caspian Sea. Already in 1992, the position of 
the Azerbaijan Repubhc under president Elçibey was that the Caspian Sea is a ‘lake’ and 
its division should be made according to the median line principle. After the take over of 
the power by Aliyev, the position did not change.
In addition, in the Azerbaijani constitution, ratified by November 1995, the status 
of the Caspian as a ‘lake’ is clearly established and the territorial sovereignty of the 
Republic on the matter of the division of the Caspian Sea was declared as such: ‘The 
territory of the Azerbaijan Republic shall be united, inviolable and indivisible. The 
Azerbaijan Republic territory shall include the Azerbaijan Republic inner waters, the
The disagreement between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the energy lobby was most apparent in 
their evaluations of the ‘Contract of the Century’ of 20 September 1994, when the Foreign Ministry 
declared the contract unacceptable and added that all the unilateral acts concerning the Caspian Sea are 
unviable and ‘Russia reserves the right to take necessary measures to restore the broken order and all the 
responsibility in these cases including the material damage will rest on those taking unilateral actions’. 
However the representatives of the Oil and Gas Ministry and LUKoil were celebrating the ‘Contract of the 
Century’ (the agreement between the Azerbaijan Republic and the international oil companies over 
developing three oil fields which were located in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea) and the then 
Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin stated that Russia had no problem with the Azerbaijani activities in 
the Caspian. “Aliyev-Russia not Concerned with by Azerbaijan’s Oil Deal with Britain,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 11 June 1994.
It is now observed that the energy lobby has won a victory against the neo-imperial minded bureaucracy as 
Russia officially recognized the division of the seabed. See Fedorov, supra 82.
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Caspian Sea (Lake) sector relating to the Azerbaijan Republic, air space over the 
Azerbaijan Republic.
In several occasions, this position of Azerbaijan has been confirmed by Aliyev, by 
the prime ministry and by the top officials of the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan RepubUc. 
For instance, on 8 August 1997, the prime minister of Azerbaijan, speaking to an 
Azerbaijani TV station was quoted as saying that: ‘The Caspian is a border lake belonging 
to five coastal countries. Therefore, in accordance with normal international practice, it 
must be shared out between them and divided into sectors in the same way as the 
American Great Lakes and Lake Chad in Africa.
Azerbaijan based its argument on that the Caspian Sea was earlier, in 1970, 
delimited by the USSR Ministry for the Oil and Gas Industry into sectors among the 
neighboring republics, while the Sea was already delimited between the USSR and Iran by 
drawing a boundary line across the sea between Astara and Hasankuli,^’ though it was not 
confirmed by the formal agreements. This practice meant that the Caspian Sea was 
accepted as a lake and Azerbaijan would continue the practice just as before, (see Map 2)
For a detailed analysis of the conflict between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the energy lobby see 
Hawa Kök, ‘T he Effects of the Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue on Russian Foreign Policy,” (Ph.D. diss. The 
University of Leeds, October 1999).
’’ “Constitution of Azerbaijan,” Republic of Azerbaijan, 26 February 2000 
<http://www.president.az/azerbaiian/const.htm> (20 July 2000).
‘Turkmen-Azeri Oilfield Dispute Remains Unresolved,” Reuters Business Briefing, 8 August 1997.
In spite of the insistent Azerbaijani statements on the ‘lake’ status of the Caspian, unfortunately, it has to 
be noted that several researchers dealing with the issue refer to the Azerbaijani approach as accepting the 
Caspian as a ‘sea’.
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Azerbaijan may be accepted as the most stable littoral state in its policy toward 
the legal status and regime of the Caspian Sea. As for the legal regime policy, Azerbaijan 
from the very beginning insisted in its argument of sectoral division. Azerbaijan did not 
approach to agree with Russia, when Russia and Iran declared the Contract unviable after 
the ‘Contract of the Century’, when Russia, in its letter to the UN, mentioned ‘material 
damage’ against unilateral acts -implying Azerbaijan- beyond economic sanctions (which 
were not approved by Chernomyrdin). Azerbaijan did not come into terms with Russia, 
even in December 1996, when Yevgeniy Primakov, the prime minister of Russian 
Federation proposed a compromise stating, “We are prepared to recognize the jurisdiction 
of each Caspian state not only in the offshore zones of up to 45 miles but also with regard 
to the deposits which are outside the agreed limits of this zone where oil extraction is 
already in progress or should begin so.”‘°‘^
The insistence of Azerbaijan on delimitation and especially delimitation in 
accordance with the 1970 decision of the USSR Ministry of Oil Industry is understandable, 
as this would give Azerbaijan the highest possible share. When the Caspian Sea would be 
divided, some of its largest oil and gas reservoirs will remain in the Azerbaijani sector. 
Azerbaijani sector is estimated to contain 25 of the 32 known oil and gas fields of the Sea
”  Gizzatov, 56, Mehdiyoun, 183, Mikhail Alexandrov, “Russian Kazakh Contradictions on the Caspian 
Legal Status,” Russian Eurasian Bulletin, February 1998 
<http://yyww.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/bulfeb98.htm> (28 May 2000).
“Ministers Cited on Caspian Sea Status,” FBIS-SOV-96-240, 7 December 1996.
47
as well as 145 of the 386 prospective structures. According to the mentioned 
delimitation of 1970, Azerbaijan had about 80,000 sq km, the same share with 
Turkmenistan, Kazakstan had 113,000 sq km, and Russia had 64,000 sq km of the Caspian 
floor.*“
Together with the high stakes of delimitation, the US political support has also 
been effective in Azerbaijan’s insistence over sectoral division. At the beginning, officially 
the US seemed to support the idea, which was backed by all the littoral states, that the 
legal status issue must be resolved with the consensus of all the littoral states.*“  Naturally, 
Azerbaijan was the most determined supporter of the statement. The US provision of the 
idea was an indirect hold up of the Azerbaijani position. However soon after the US 
support became more apparent, though not pressingly.
The development of the US support might be followed in the official records of 
the US bureaucrats. In October 1997, Stuart Eizenstat, the Undersecretary of State for 
Economic, Business and Cultural Affairs, answering a question whether the US had taken 
a position on the classification of the Caspian Sea as a ‘sea’ or a ‘lake’ or not, stated, “We 
have been encouraging all the littoral states to resolve their territorial disputes in
Michael Croissant and Cynthia Croissant, ‘The Caspian Sea Status Dispute: Azerbaijani Perspectives," 
Caucasus Regional Studies 1 (1998) <http://www.poli.vub.accomodation.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-01.htiTi> 
(19 February 1999).
Khoshbakht [Hoçbaht] Yusufzâde, “The Status of the Caspian,” Azerbaijan International V.2 N.4 
(Winter 1994)
<http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24 folder/24 articles/24 statuscaspian.html> (3 
December 1999).
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accordance with international legal principles. We have not tried to involve ourselves in 
legal disputes or in the legal m e r i t s . I n  the same meeting, regarding the call of the 
president of Amoco (the oil company which has large stakes in the Azerbaijan oil projects) 
to the US subcommittee to help resolving the legal status of the Caspian Sea to protect 
private investment, Senator Brownback stated, “ This question is certainly one for the 
httoral states to resolve... the important thing is though to realize the condominium 
concept that the Russians and the Iranians are putting forward would indeed put them in 
the driver’s seat in determining where, when and by whom private investment could take 
place, and that is the main problem with the debate.”'®^ The concern of the US government 
is apparently testified in 1999, when the Special Advisor to the President and secretary of 
State on Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, ambassador Richard Morningstar, stated that: 
“... and we believe the sectoral boundaries are ultimately the best way to go. It is 
important that settlement of these issues not hold up exploration and development of the 
Caspian resources.”'®^
3.3. 6. Iran
Iran’s approach to the legal status of the Caspian Sea was not much different 
from that of Russia. Iran’s main argument was that the Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921 and 
1940 must govern until the five littoral states jointly devise a new legal regime for the Sea.
“Ministry Official Views Caspian Sea Status,” FBIS-SOV-95-098, 20 May 1995, “Russia Develops 
Joint Statement on Development of Caspian Sea,” Reuters Business Briefing, 28 August 1995.
104 uyg Interests in the Caspian Region: Hearing of the International Economic Policy, Export and Trade 
Promotion Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, 23 October
1997.
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According to the 1921 and 1940 treaties, the Caspian Sea was accepted as a ‘joint Soviet- 
Iranian Sea’, on which both sides have the equal rights. Besides, Iran strictly argued that 
unilateral actions on the Sea, without the consensus of aU the littoral states, are illegal. 
This argument certainly targeted Azerbaijan at the first place and Kazakstan at the second.
Iran, just like Russia, refrained from defining the legal status of the Sea precisely. 
The Iranian news agencies seemed to be confused in their terminology possibly because of 
the priority of defining the legal regime, and the insignificance of setting the legal status in 
their opinions'* ’^. As for the Iranian officials, they have officially pronounced neither the 
term ‘lake’ nor ‘sea’, for the Caspian Sea.
The National Iranian Oil Company official in charge of oil exploration stated that: 
‘The Caspian is an inland sea whose status is not defined as an open sea.”‘°® As stated 
before, the Iranian foreign minister, Velayati also named the Caspian Sea as ‘the world’s 
largest inland sea’ Thus, Iran claimed that the rules of the International Law of the Sea 
Convention could not be applied to the Caspian, as it was not an open sea.”° Besides, it 
was not a ‘lake’ ; therefore, sectoral division as a part of international customary law was 
not under discussion. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, “Due to its size.
In the same commentary of ‘Iran News National Desk’, the Caspian Sea at first called as ‘the world’s 
largest inland sea’, then stated that the Sea could be defined as a ’lake’ in search for its legal status, and 
lastly it is stated that Tehran prefers to maintain the status of the Caspian as a ‘sea’. ‘The Caspian Rising 
Its Health Deteriorates,” Iran News, 16 April 1995 <http://www.netiran.com/search.html> (4 July 2000).
‘‘Iran-Caspian Sea Iranian Proposal on Caspian Sea Legal Regime Conforms to International Law,” 28 
October 1995, <http://www.netiran.com/search.html> (4 July 2000).
109 “Velayati Calls Caspian Sea "Common Heritage" of Littoral States,” 23 October 1996, 
<http://www.netiran.com/search.html> (3 July 2000).
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geographical situation, environmental condition, and the presence of littoral states, the 
Caspian Sea is quite a special and unique sea; thus, the usual international legal practices 
do not completely correspond to the needs of the area.”‘"Accordingly, Iran defended the 
estabhshment of territorial waters for each httoral state and the remaining part would be 
under joint exploitation.
Until it was extracted from the Azerbaijani oU projects, Iran remained silent to the 
unilateral exploitation acts of Azerbaijan. However, after being taken out from the projects 
because of the high pressure of the USA over the Azerbaijani government, Iran took the 
opposition side together with Russia. In its letter addressing the United Nations, Iran 
severely criticized unilateral acts in the Caspian Sea without the consent of the other 
httoral states, and warned, “the full responsibihty for consequences of such illegal 
measures and actions, including damage caused to other coastal states, rests with the states 
violating the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.”"^ However, by 1998, the Iranian approach 
to the legal regime, which was the co-ownership of the Caspian, loosened as the Russian 
attitude towards the delimitation of the seabed softened. The Iranian deputy Foreign 
minister for Europe and the Americas, Morteza Sarmadi, in his interview to an Iranian 
daily, explained, “Iran prefers common ownership, but if the view of aU the other httoral 
states is for division of the sea we beheve principles such as just and equal shares.
However, the 1982 Convention can be applied on the inland seas, as are defined by the 1982 
Convention.
“ * Abbas Maliki, “Economic Development of the Caspian Sea Region,” Iran News, 25 June 1995 
<http://netiran.eom/Htdocs/Clippings/Fpolitics/950625XXFP01.html> (5 July 2000).
“Iran Complains to United Nations over Azerbaijan’s Use of Caspian Sea,” Reuters Business Briefing, 
17 November 1997.
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uniformity of the regime under the bed and over the bed and the non-militarization of the
sea must be considered/ ,113
An Iranian commentator notes that if the Caspian Sea is delimited into sectors, 
the Iranian share would be the minimum, namely the region below the Astara-Hasankuli 
line"'*, which consists only a 12 percent of aU the seabed."^ Besides, it was calculated by 
an international law speciahst that the application of the equidistance line principle gave a 
14,6 percent to Iran."^ However, the Iranian Director-General for Commonwealth of 
Independent States and Caucasia at the Foreign Ministry, Firuz Dowlatabadi, approaches 
to the debate from a different point of view and stated “If the sea is to be divided among 
the littoral states, Iran's share is more than 20 per cent and the proposal to give one fifth of 
the sea to each country has just been made out of good intention and aimed at upgrading 
the level of convergence in the region.” He defends his point claiming that Iran was one of 
the two major parts of the previous documents regulating the Caspian affairs that was why 
Iran should have a bigger share than 20 per cent."’
It is apparent that the major fear of Iran in case of a sectoral division is that the 
smallest share will be Iran’s. For that reason, Iran gave the signal that it would not oppose
“An Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister,” Ettelaat, 2 June 1998 
<http://netiran.eom/Htdocs/Clippings/Fpolitics/980602XXFP01.html> (5 July 2000).
Dabiri evaluates the arguments claiming a borderline between Astara and Hasankuli as ‘amateurish’. 
Dabiri, 32.
Jamshid Momtaz, “Iran’s View on Caspian Administration,” Iran Today 21 (1998): 47-48 
<http://netiran.eom/Htdocs/Clippings/Fpolitics/980501XXFP01.html> (5 July 2000).
Clagett.
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a sectoral division, however its major condition for that was an equal or at least an 
equitable division. Iranian president Khatemi, at the opening ceremony of ECO in Tehran n 
June 2000, mentioned the legal status issue and stated, “A regime of joint ownership will 
certainly meet aU the needs of the littoral states, however should these littoral states share 
a sharing scheme of the Sea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is ready to support the idea of 
division of the sea based on just and equal shares.”
3. 3.7. Kazakstan
Kazakstan’s position regarding the Caspian’s legal status was yet unformulated 
during the 1993 prime ministers’ meeting in Astrakhan. Later, on July 1994, Kazakstan 
submitted a draft “Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea” to the other 
littorals of the Sea. Since then, this draft formulated the Kazak approach to the legal issues 
of the Caspian Sea.’^ °
According to the draft Convention, Kazak view as to the legal status of the 
Caspian is based on the ‘enclosed sea’ concept.'^* Thus, Kazakstan stood for the 
application of the rules of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982.‘^  ^ However, all the 
regulations of the 1982 Convention should not be applied in a mechanical way.
“Iranian President Opens Regional Summit- Urges Defining Caspian’s Legal Status,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 10 June 2000.
The Kazakh premier, Sergey Tereshchenko, told Interfax that his cabinet had not yet prepared a plan to 
develop oil and gas deposits on the Caspian shelf. “Premiers Agree to Set up Council for Cooperation in 
Caspian Region,” Reuters Business Briefing, 19 October 1993.
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Considering the special features of the Caspian Sea, the rules have to be adapted in an 
appropriate manner to the Caspian case.
Kazakstan proposed that the seabed and the resources should be delimited among 
the Uttoral states. Consequently, each state would have sovereign rights the seabed and its 
resources in its sector. Kazakstan supported its argument not only with the international 
norms and the experience of mineral resource exploitation, but also with the historical 
experience on the Caspian Sea. Regarding the historical experience Kazakstan argued that 
on the Caspian Sea, the previous littoral states, USSR and Iran, had never applied common 
ownership; on the contrary, each one extracted and exploited the resources without the 
permission and information of the other. Besides, referring to the 1970 division of the 
Caspian Sea among the Soviet republics, Kazakstan argued that already a sectoral division
19"^existed on the Caspian Sea.
Kazakstan also referred to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention in regards to the 
delimitation of the sea surface. After delimiting the seabed and its resources, it argued that 
the appropriate zones (territorial waters, exclusive economic zone), to which the coastal 
states’ sovereignty would be applied, should be established.'^'' “Besides, fishing and 
exploitation of biological resources should be carried out by each state inside the relevant 
offshore zones of an agreed width and also through the establishment of fishing quotas and
•22 “Ufvj. Speakers Criticize Coercive, Unilateral Measures Taken by Certain States as Legal Committee 
Concludes Debate on Law Decade,” Reuters Business Briefing, 20 October 1997.
Çevik, 53-54. 
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licenses. Each littoral state should practice the exploitation of mineral resources inside its 
own zone. The development of deposits inside the zones of two or more states should be 
the subject of an agreement on sharing the output between the relevant states. The political 
and military existence in the Caspian Sea should be excluded.”*^  ^ At the same time, 
Kazakstan claims the right of the land-locked littoral states to passage through the Volga 
basin to the high seas.
On July 6, 1998, Kazakstan signed an ‘eternal friendship agreement’ with Russia, 
in which the above-mentioned regulations were partly accepted. Although the agreement 
had vague articles, its significance lays in the fact that Russia for the first time had 
accepted some kind of a division, though the division was restricted to the seabed. 
Moreover, the document said that if any oil or gas deposit were in between the national 
sectors it would be jointly developed by both sides. This rule has recently been proposed 
by the Russian side as a solution to the current and potential disputable cases, but failed in 
its first attempt.
3.3. 8. Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan, different from the other four republics, did not have its own 
conceptualization of the Caspian Sea’s legal status. It preferred to follow the others’ 
arguments, changing sides from time to time. The sole act of Turkmenistan on the issue
“Ministers Cited on Caspian Sea Status,’’ FBIS-SOV-96-240,1 December 1996
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was its declaration of 12-mile territorial waters, on the Caspian Sea, on 1 October 1993.^ ^  ^
This meant the acceptance of the Law of the Sea Convention. However, Turkmenistan on 
a number of occasions, expressed its agreement with the Russian-Iranian view, that is to 
say the joint ownership of the Sea.
At the same time, Turkmenistan accepted that until new legal regime was reached 
by a consensus of aU the httoral states, the agreements between the USSR and Iran made
in 1921 and 1940 were vahd. 127
While Turkmenistan, on 24 October 1993, in its communiqué with Iran agreed on 
the point that “no decision may be taken about the exploitation of the Caspian Sea or 
about its international and legal standing without the participation of all its coastal 
countries”,^ ‘*at the same time issued tenders and signed agreements with the western oil 
companies on the development of offshore oil fields.
Turkmenistan is currently developing oil fields far from 12-mile off its shore, 
claiming ownership rights over the oil deposits which are on the border between 
Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan sectors and declaring that it shares ‘very similar ideas’ over the
Kerimov, 33.
Yolbars Kepbanov, “The New Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is the Basis of Regional Cooperation and 
Stability,” Perceptions V.2 N.4 (1998): 9 and “Russian-Turkmen Communiqué Hails ‘Strategic 
Partnership’,” Reuters Business Briefing, 9 August 1997.
“Iran and Turkmenistan Issue Joint Communiqué at the End of Rafsanjani’s Visit,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 26 October 1993.
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legal status issue with Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan, all of which contradicts with each 
other.
“Commodities and Agriculture: Turkmenistan Awards Tenders to Western Companies,” Reuters 
Business Briefing, 18 November 1993.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BORDER DISPUTES AMONG THE LITTORAL STATES; THE 
DISPUTE BETWEEN AZERBAUAN AND TURKMENISTAN
Historical analysis indicates us that the positions of the littoral states in the disputes 
over the legal status of the Caspian Sea are shaped mainly by their standpoints as to the 
Caspian legal regime. The way, in which the legal status will be adapted and the 
management of the resources will be conducted, determines the littoral states’ political and 
economic benefits. In this context, Russian Federation has a special place. Beyond being 
the successor to the USSR, Russia played a major role in the evolution of the legal dispute.
At the beginning, Russia severely opposed unilateral acts (specifically against 
Azerbaijan) and in this way formed an alliance with Iran (sometimes Turkmenistan also 
joined in). Simultaneously, it was uncomfortable about the western involvement in the 
Caspian Sea issues through either oil companies or governmental institutions and it made 
several attempts to solve the legal question arranging bilateral negotiations and multilateral 
meetings. Thus, Russia always stayed at the very center of the dispute. Certainly, its 
struggle is not to loose its power in the region on the one hand, and grasp as much 
economic stakes as possible from the Caspian oil wealth on the other.
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On the Caspian Sea, Russia tried to maintain such a regime, as a result of which it 
wUl have the opportunity to have some degree of control in the region’s economic and 
pohtical activities. The common ownership principle would give this advantage at the 
maximum level. Because of several factors, however, Russia was obliged to accept the 
division of the seabed. On 6 July 1998, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed an ‘eternal 
friendship treaty’ in Moscow, and in accordance with the treaty, the seabed of the northern 
Caspian was divided between the two countries, thus, the mineral resources of the Caspian 
Sea. The treaty was not just an agreement between Kazakstan and Russia, as Russia for 
the first time accepted the division of the resources of the Caspian Sea; though the sea 
itself was not divided into sectors and the issues of fishery, navigation and ecology were to 
be regulated jointly. The only defendant of the joint exploitation of the mineral resources 
remained Iran. However, Iran did not insist on its position either and added the sectoral 
division option in its argument with several conditions to prevent any detriment to its 
interests in case of delimitation.
As a result of these shifts toward the sectoral division argument, the main point of 
the disputes has also shifted from whether the Sea should be divided or not, to how it 
should be divided. The border dispute is the result of the uncertainty in the way of division. 
Although, the border dispute was under debate since 1994, the dimension of the problem 
has broadened as the supporters of the division issue have increased. Before Russia and 
Iran joined the issue, Kazakstan and Azerbaijan, as the two defendants of the division of 
the Sea, had no problem as to the borderline between themselves, because it is very short 
and few oil fields exist in the disputable area. Turkmenistan, although in several occasions
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took part with Russia and Iran against the division of the Caspian, on the one hand opened 
tenders for its offshore oil fields, which was a unilateral act according to the conunon 
ownership argument and on the other entered into a discussion with Azerbaijan on the oil 
fields in the middle of the Sea, claiming that the fields were in the sector of Turkmenistan.
The dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the sea borders emanated 
from Turkmenistan’s claims over some of the oil fields, which Azerbaijan considered for 
oil exploitation. Mainly these oil fields are Azeri, Çerag, and Kepez (as Azerbaijan named 
them).
4. 1. Dispute over the Azeri-Çerag oil Helds
The issue came on the table, on January 20, 1997, when Niyazov declared that the 
two oil fields did not belong to Azerbaijan, but to Turkmenistan. It was surprising, as 
Azerbaijan had already signed $8 billion-deals with western oil companies on the 
exploitation of these oil fields on September 20, 1994.
The immediate response came from the head of the State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), Khoshbakht Yusufzade, who has a deep personal 
experience on oil extraction activities in the Caspian Sea. In his article, published in 
Azerbaijan International, he pointed out many arguments defending the Azerbaijani 
position that those oil fields belonged to Azerbaijan. First, he mentioned the international
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rules, which referred to the different regulations with regard to seabed and sea surface. He 
asserted that setting 12-mile hmit for fishing rights did not mean that the mineral resources 
must also be restricted as such, and he supported his arguments with the practice in the 
North Sea where Britain, Norway, and Holland, dividing the seabed, shared the mineral 
resources for years without any conflict. In his assertion, he considered that 
Turkmenistan found it illegal for Azerbaijan to exploit oil wells outer than the 12-mile limit 
because Turkmenistan declared 12-mile territorial waters for itself. However, 
Turkmenistan’s claim for illegality of the Azerbaijani act finds its reason in the ownership 
of the fields, not the distance of the fields fi'om the shore.
Yusufzâde supported the ownership of Azerbaijan over the fields also with “the 
1970 division of the Sea by the Soviet Oil Industry according to the internationally 
accepted law of equidistance method.”*^  ^He added that Azerbaijan, beginning firom 1970s, 
carried out, and was responsible for all the research, discoveries, explorations and 
exploitations of oil in the Caspian Sea, and in that period Azerbaijani scientists found more 
than 15 petroleum reservoirs in the region including Azeri, Çerağ, Güneşli (which is the 
third field of the ‘Contract of the Century’ together with Azeri and Çerağ). Consequently,
the historical experience confirms Azerbaijani argument. 133
Yusufzade, ‘T he Status of the Caspian.”
“Turkmenistan Lays Claim to Disputed Caspian Oil,” Reuters Business Briefing, 23 January 1997.
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Another point of the Azerbaijani side against Turkmenistan’s argument was the 
fact that there are oil fields (one of which is Kepez), which re developed by Azerbaijan, 
further from Azeri and ^erag fields, which are claimed to be in the sector of Turkmenistan. 
Thus, Turkmenistan could not oppose the development of these nearer fields by 
Azerbaijan, as it did not claim any right over further ones.*^ '* (see Map 3)
Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry proposed holding talks with Turkmenistan to settle 
possible disputes over rival claims over the oU fields. The talks continued until another oU 
field became the core of the dispute between the two countries.
4. 2. Disputes over the Kepez Oil Field
Azerbaijani officials several times referred to the Kepez oil field as being in the 
Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea and being further from the disputed oil fields, Azeri 
and Çerag. In fact this was an open invitation to the Turkmenistan side to claim ownership 
right over also the Kepez field.
By March 1997, Turkmenistan was planning an oil tender, which would open six 
more offshore oil fields of Turkmenistan to the development of oil companies. However, 
the tender was postponed “until a decision over the delimitation of the Caspian Sea was 
reached.”^^  ^At the same time, the development of the Kepez oil field, which is nearer to 
Turkmenistan and is accepted even by the Azerbaijani officials to be possibly on the
“Baku Proposes Talks With Turkmenistan to Settle Caspian Dispute,” Reuters Business Briefing, 31 
January 1997.
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borderline between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, had long been under discussion. As early 
as April 1994, that is before the development agreement of the Azeri and Çerağ fields was 
signed, LUKOil offered Azerbaijani government to develop Kepez in return for its share in 
the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC - the consortium which is responsible 
from the development of Azeri, Çerağ and Güneşli oil f ie lds) .The  Turkmen claims over 
the oil fields most likely urged Azerbaijani officials to take necessary steps to move further 
and start developing the fields, over which Turkmenistan might claim ownership and even 
open a tender (in such a case Azerbaijan would not have much to do as the legal status and 
regime of the Sea have not been established yet).
4. 2.1. Azerbaijani Deal Over Development of the Kepez Oil Field
In June 1997, the negotiations were conducted between the Azerbaijani officials 
and the representatives of the LUKOil and Rosneft alongside Nemtsov, Russian First 
Deputy Prime Minister. It was also said that the deal had in fact been initiated by Russian 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.*^’ On July 4, 1997 the $1 bn agreement was signed 
between the parties, sharing the prize in the following way: SOCAR: 50%, LUKOil: 30% 
and Rosneft: 20%. Turkmenistan was not late in reacting to the agreement. The day after, 
the Foreign Ministry of Turkmenistan protested the agreement “on the grounds that the 
field in question belonged not to Azerbaijan, but to Turkmenistan.”*^* The wording of the 
note, however, implied more than just a protest: ‘The ministry categorically demands that 
the oil accord be scrapped in order to avoid possible consequences for which
‘Turkmen Oil Tender Hinges on End to Caspian Row,” Reuters Business Briefing, 12 March 1997. 
‘‘Russia’s LUKOil seeks New Azeri Oil and Gas Deal,” Reuters Business Briefing, 5 April 1994.
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Turkmenistan will not bear responsibility what so ever.” In the statement, the claim over 
the other two oil fields was also repeated, however, this time with a slight alteration: “"The 
Russian Federation and other Caspian httoral states know very well that Turkmenistan 
objects to the fact that its legal rights to such oilfields as Kaverochkin and The 26 Baku 
Commissars, which have been renamed by Baku as (^erag and Azeri, are openly ignored. 
The former oilfield belongs partly to Turkmenistan whereas the latter belongs to 
Turkmenistan fully.”*^  ^ Being aware that this statement would not have an effect on the 
signed agreement, the issue was held in Niyazov’s Moscow visit and on August 7, Niyazov 
announced that the Russian government had annulled $1 bn deal between Russian 
companies and Azerbaijani government to develop the disputed field.
In this way, Turkmenistan, this time, won over Azerbaijan. Moreover, the 
postponed call for tender came to the agenda not much later, on August 14. Although the 
fields included in the tender were not made public, it was an obvious counter attack. On 
September 1, 1997, the fields for tender were announced, among which was Kepez 
(Turkmenistan named it Serdar).^ '*^
4. 2. 2. Power Struggle Between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan
“Caspian Sea Oil Field Dispute,” IBRV Boundary and Security Bulletin 3 (1997): 15. 
‘Turkmenistan Protests at Russian Azeri Oil Agreement,” Reuters Business Briefing, 08 July 1997.
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Turkmenistan’s tender turned into a power struggle between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan announced that it would apply sanctions against any company 
bidding on the disputed field.However, in June 1998, Mobil won the right, under the 
September tender, to develop the field, and the Turkmenistan government invited Mobil to 
begin talks on development plans. However, later the victory turned to be a 
disappointment for Turkmenistan as Mobil announced that it would not sign an agreement 
with Turkmenistan or do any more than a preliminary analysis of the field until the two 
countries settle the dispute. Consequently, Turkmenistan declared that the company lost its 
exclusive right to develop the oil field as “it failed to begin talks within the time frame set 
by the government”.
The talks continued between the sides without a resolution. After the Ashgabat 
meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries on February 5, 1998, a joint 
statement was adopted: ‘The sides have agreed to divide the sectors of the Caspian Sea 
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan along the median Une in accordance with the 
generally recognized principles and norms of international law on the basis of realizing 
their sovereign rights to the Caspian and taking into account the existing interests of the 
littoral s t a t e s .T h o u g h  this joint statement seemed to solve the question theoretically, it 
came to nothing since the sides insistently continued to argue the ownership rights over the 
disputed fields, drawing their own median lines.
“Mobil Has Another Important Oil Interest in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan,” Game Scenario 
<http://www.la.utexas.edu/chenry/oil/Scenario98a.html> (20 June 2000).
“Mobil, Cairn and Texuna Loose Exclusive Rights in Turkmenistan,” Azerbaijan International V.4 N.5 
(March 17, 1999) <http://www.azer.com> (3 December 1999).
Turkmenistan opened a new tender in September 1999, but this time did not include the disputed oil 
fields.
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4. 2. 3. The US Mediation
The dispute once more heated up in the mid-1999 (14 May), when the USA 
involved in the issue to mediate between the conflicting sides with its three-optional 
proposal. The exploration of gas m the Şah Deniz field (on May 29th), in the mean time, 
made the solution almost impossible. The US backed Trans-Caspian Pipeline project 
(TCP-project for a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Ceyhan), became a instrument for 
both states to gain the upper hand in the oil field dispute. Azerbaijan wanted its gas to be 
added in the TCP, however Turkmenistan rejected. On the one hand, Niyazov firmly linked 
the start of construction of the pipeline to an agreement on ownership of the disputed oil 
f i e l d s . O n  the other hand, Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: 
“Delimitation of the Caspian Sea among its littoral states will be a precondition of 
Azerbaijan’s participation in a sub-sea Caspian gas pipeline project.”“*^
At the end of August 1999, it became certain that US options would not be 
undertaken, as none of the three options were agreed upon by both sides. On the other 
hand, the US, in support for the TCP (which has become one of the US political priorities 
in the region as the project decreases the relative powers of Russia and Iran in the region).
‘Turkmens, Azeris Agree To Median Line Division of Caspian,” FBIS-SOV-98-037, 6 February 1998. 
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during the OSCE summit in Istanbul, sustained an agreement indicating that the 
Kepez/Serdar dispute will not stand on the way of TCP cooperation.*'*’
The last incident on the issue is Turkmenistan’s proposal for the development of 
the disputed oil field together with Iran.*'*® Turkmenistan obviously tries to take Iran on its 
side and thus, without agreeing with Azerbaijan, guarantee the field’s possession. 
However, Iran has not replied the proposal yet.
4. 2. 4. An Analytic Approach to the Dispute
Baku had a special place in the history of oil extraction. By 1901, Baku oil fields 
were placed first in the world in the amount of oil extracted, 11,5 million tons per year, a 
worldwide record at that time.*'*^  That is why the oil industry, science and technology so 
well developed in Azerbaijan in comparison with the other littoral states. Consequently, 
most of the exploration and development activities were conducted by the Azerbaijani 
scientists and institutions. However, both sides agreed on the delimitation of the Caspian 
among the republics within the USSR.
Robert Cutler, “Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan: The Caspian Offshore Oil and Gas Conflict,” Central 
Asia-Caucasia Analyst 19 January 2000 <http://www.cacianalyst.org/Jan%2019/Cutler.htm> (25 May 
2000).
‘Turkmenistan May Develop Caspian Oil Field with Iran,” Azerbaijan International V.5 N.7 (27 April 
200) <http://www.azer.com> (15 June 2000).
Khoshbakht [Ho§baht] Yusufzade, “The Development of the Oil and Gas Industry in Azerbaijan,” 
Azerbaijan International V.4 N.2 (Summer 1996)
<http”//www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/42_folder/42_articles/42_socarkhoshbakht.html> (11
June 2000).
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In 1970, the sectoral division of the Sea was realized by the USSR Ministry of Oil 
and Gas Industry. The delimitation was carried out based on equidistance method. SOCAR 
claimed the ownership of the disputed fields in reference to this delimitation, and argued 
that according to the 1970 delimitation all the three disputed oil fields belonged to 
Azerbaijan. Besides, although most of the research in the Caspian sea was conducted by 
the Azerbaijani officials, the explored oil and gas fields in the other sectors were notified to 
the relevant governments. In this way, Güneşli, Çerağ, Azeri and Kepez oil fields remained 
in the Azerbaijani sector, while the fields of Livanov East, Lum, Gubkina, Barinova and 
Prechelikenski Kupol were found in the Turkmen sector.*^’ However, the argument was 
rejected by Turkmenistan on the basis that the 1970 delimitation was no more than an 
administrative regulation as it was just an order of the Ministry of Oil Industry, but not a 
regulatory decision of the ‘Supreme Soviet’, which was the only body to set and change 
boundaries between the republics. Besides, all the mineral resources were actually owned
by the USSR. 152
Besides, it was proposed by the SOCAR that this delimitation gave rise to no 
objection from any of the former republics neither during the Soviet Union, nor after the 
dissolution of the USSR.^^  ^Even after the ‘Contract of the Century’ (20 September 1994),
The US at that time was producing 1 million ton per year.
Yusufzâde, ‘T he Development of the Oil and Gas Industry in Azerbaijan.”
Yusufzâde, ‘T he Status of the Caspian.”
Yağmur Kochumov [Koçumov], “Issues of International Law and Politics in the Caspian in the Context 
of the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan Discussion and Fuel Transport,” Caspian Crossroads Magazine V .4 1.2 
(Winter 1999) <http//:ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usaazerb/422.htm (20 May 2000).
“SOCAR’s Official Statement by Natig Aliyev President of SOCAR,” Azerbaijan International V.5 N.3 
(Autumn 1997)
<http”//www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/53_folder/53_articles/53_statement.html> ( 10 June 
2000)
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Turkmenistan, claiming ownership over the two oil fields among the three, which were the 
subjects of the Contract, claimed no rights for almost three years.
Another inconsistency of Turkmenistan is that its officials defend the joint 
ownership principle, but at the same time, the disputed fields are claimed to be of 
Turkmenistan.^ '^* However, these two positions contradict with each other.
4. 2. 5. Joint Development
On the other hand, Azerbaijan also presents inconsistencies within its own attitude 
toward the resolution of the dispute over the status of the Kepez field.
The immediate reaction of the SOCAR to the annulment of the deal with the 
Russian companies over Kepez, was favoring the sole ownership rights of Azerbaijan over 
Kepez. However, the Foreign Ministry, at the same time, stated that Azerbaijan was 
ready to discuss “any mutually beneficial proposal with Turkmenistan.”*^® The prime 
minister’s first commentary was in the following way: “Azerbaijan has never considered 
Kepez to be entirely its own, since it is located between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
sectors of the Caspian Sea.”*®’ Aliyev defended Azerbaijani position referring to the
154 Kepbanov, 15.
YusufzSde, ‘T he Status of the Caspian.”
“Foreign Minister Reacts to Turkmen Concerns over Oil Deal,” FBIS-SOV-97-189,
8Jul 1997.
“Baku Regrets Withdrawal of Russian Oil Companies From Deal,” FBIS-SOV-97-219, 7 August 1997.
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exploration of the field by Azerbaijan, while admitting the debatable location of the field: 
“We know that Kepez is half way between us, but our oil producers have drilled the first 
exploratory well in it.”‘^ ® Following these comments, in many occasions, either through 
diplomatic calls, or through SOCAR’s invitations, Azerbaijan called for a joint 
development of the field. On August 23, 1999, İlham Aliyev, son of the president and the 
first president of SOCAR, proposed founding a joint Azeri-Turkmen company to develop 
the disputed oil field. K e p e z . Azerbaijan’s efforts for a joint ownership were perceived 
by Turkmenistan as recognition of Azerbaijan’s flawed posit ion.Although at the 
beginning of the dispute, Azerbaijan called many times for a joint development of the 
fields, it reacted negatively to the recent Russian proposal for joint development of
disputed oil fields. 161
On the other hand, from a pure legal point of view, the delimitation rules regarding 
the median line principle set by the UN Law of the Sea Convention should be resorted to. 
In the 2*“* Part and 15* article of the Convention, it is stated that: “Where the coasts of two 
States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing 
agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median 
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above 
provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or 
other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which
158 “y^ijygv Not Worried by Russian Withdrawal from Oil Field,” FBIS-SOV-97-220, 8 August 1997.
“Azeri President’s Son Proposes Joint Exploration of Disputed Field,” Reuters Business Briefing, 25 
August 1999.
Kochumov.
“Iran agrees With Russian Plan to Share the Disputed Oil Fields in the Caspian,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 4 August 2000.
70
is at variance therewith.”^^ (^emphasis added) If the historical practice is considered, it was 
clear that Azerbaijan (although it was known that Kepez is on the borderline between the 
states) explored and developed the oil field, so historical practice gave Azerbaijan the right 
to exploit the field/^^
On the other hand, a just division, based on the median line principle would most 
probably gave the field to Turkmenistan. Kepez is located 184 km off Azerbaijan coastline 
and 104 km off Turkmenistan’s c o a s t .T h is  meant that Kepez obviously remained in the 
Turkmenistan sector. However, Azerbaijani argument stated that the islands offshore had 
to be taken into account and the starting point must be measured from the island’s 
shore. This certainly decreased the above-mentioned distance of the field from 184 km 
to approximately 145 km.*^ ® Accordingly, the field might be considered to be on the 
borderline between the two opposite states, while its major part remained in the 
Turkmenistan sector.
At this point, it is necessary to mention the three-optional proposal of the US. 
Though, the details of the proposal were kept secret and the negotiations were held behind 
the doors, as far as the officials of the negotiating sides implied, the US scheme was in the
United Nations.
However it should be noted that the legal history for the disputed oil fields is a bit vague. Both sides 
have well-supported arguments.
Cerag is 132 km away from the Turkmen coast while 148 km from Azerbaijan coast. Azeri is 118 km 
off the Turkmen coast and 160 km off Azerbaijan coast. See Izvestiia, 11 April 1998, quoted in Raczka, 
221.
Yusufzade, ‘T he Status of the Caspian.”
166 “^ijygy Nemtsov Sign accord on Caspian Oil Field Exploration,” FBIS-SOV-97-185, 4 July 1997.
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following way: There were three options for each state. The first option suited Azerbaijan 
more than Turkmenistan. The second option was vice versa. The third option was 
arranged to be a compromise, taking into account the arguments and interests of both 
states. However, it was argued that, in the last option, which was designed to be a 
compromise, the disputed Kepez field was situated in the Turkmenistan sector. Although 
through some arrangements in the development of the field the interests of Azerbaijan 
were said to be protected, Azerbaijan was not satisfied with the proposal and the matter 
remained suspended pending further discussion.*^’ Whereas Azerbaijan was not satisfied 
with the fact, the investigation conducted by the US to draw a division line involving a 
satellite most probably showed the real position of the field being in the Turkmenistan 
sector, as İlham Aliyev, when declaring Azerbaijan’s disagreement with the US proposal, 
admitted the fact a ruler would harm the Azerbaijani interests in the region: “I have kept 
telling that Kepez should not be approached with a ruler, that this field should serve the 
interests of both Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.”*^®
Thus, although the historical practice backs Azerbaijani argument, the 
contemporary rules and regulations of the Law of the Sea name the field as not ‘Kepez’, 
but ‘Serdar’.
‘T he Last Proposals of the USA Put Kyapaz in the Turkmen Sector,” Reuters Business Briefing, 23 
August 1999.
168 Proposals of the USA Put Kyapaz in the Turkmen Sector,” Reuters Business Briefing, 23
August 1999.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A distinction between the legal status and legal regime has to be made. For the 
sake of objectivity, the status issue has to be considered in isolation from all the other 
pohtical and economic considerations and anxieties. As the historical and geological 
development of the Caspian Sea is regarded, it becomes certain that it has to be recognized 
a ‘sea’.*^  ^ Its connections to the open seas in the ancient time (which is the reason for its 
saltiness) and its contemporary connection with the high seas through channels (although 
they are very narrow) support its status as a ‘sea’.
On the other hand, the practice in the Caspian Sea has been different sometimes. 
The practice through out history, points us that during the Soviet period, at the beginning 
the Sea was accepted as an ‘enclosed sea’, and all the related regulations were done 
according to this acceptance. However, through later adjustments, which were never 
reflected in the official agreements and documents, the Sea was turned into a ‘boundary 
lake’, delimiting the Sea on the Astara-Hasankuli borderline. The establishment of Free 
Information Region in 1964 through an ‘Aerial Agreement’ also supports the existence of
Raczka, 195.
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this practice. Besides, the Soviet scientists, conducting the exploration and exploitation 
of the oil fields in the Caspian Sea, report that, between 1966-1968, 44 structures were 
discovered in the Iranian shelf zone of the Caspian and Iran was notified.*^* Afterwards, on 
development of these structures, talks went on between Iran and USSR. These and 
relevant evidence indicate that the Caspian Sea was delimited between its two neighbors, 
as the regulations for lakes necessitate.
On the other hand, it is the crucial point that, although 1982 Convention backs the 
historical practice over the contemporary regulations, considering the new geopolitical 
conditions in the region and various interests of the littoral states, it is practically 
impossible to exercise the historical practice without any transformations. Whether the Sea 
win be recognized a ‘sea’ or a ‘lake’, the delimitation rule prevails. However, it is 
inescapable to establish more regulations. Even if the legal status of the Sea brings the 
complete division of the Sea into national sectors, the supporters of the ‘division’ idea also 
have to recognize some regulations as to the issues relating to the general provisions of the 
Caspian Sea, even if they continue to insist on unacceptability of any restriction over the 
sovereignty of the state. The environmental, navigational and fishing regulations, which are 
vital for the peace and security of the Sea, have to be decided with the consent of aU the 
littorals.
170 Dabiri, 32.
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June 2000).
74
It is now more apparent that the Sea will be fully divided into sectors, though for 
now there is a consensus only for the seabed delimitation. Besides, unfortunately, it has 
also been apparent that the division process will cause many political disputes and conflicts 
among the littoral states. The border disputes have already started negatively affecting 
bilateral relations of the neighbor states, which have economic and political benefit in 
cooperation and economic collaboration. Already in July 2000, a border dispute between 
Iran and Azerbaijan has caused the increase of tension between the states to the point that, 
Iran’s supreme leader Ayatullah Hamanei addressing the soldiers commented on the issue 
in a severe way of speech: “Iran will not allow enemy states on its borders to humiliate it.” 
’^^Besides, Niyazov has raised claims over some of the oil fields, which Iran recognizes as 
its own. These all are the signs of the prospective political disputes emanating from the 
uncertainty over the Caspian legal status, and lack of consensus among the littoral states 
over the Caspian legal regime.
As the analysis of the Azeri-Turkmen border dispute indicates, an overall 
consideration of historical practice, contemporary rules of international law (i.e. 
implementing the equidistance principle in dividing the Caspian) and the current interests 
of the littoral states, together with the primary condition of consensus of all the sides, may 
solve the current and possible disputes, securing the peace and cooperation in the region.
“Iranian Supreme Leader Reportedly Accuses Azerbaijan of Claims on Caspian,” Reuters Business 
Briefing, 26 July 2000.
75
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